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Open Questions in Sovereign Debt
Sovereign debt markets have demonstrated incredible resil-ience despite a century of dramatic political and economic up-
heaval. Among the most remarkable aspects of the contemporary debt 
regime is the degree to which expectations of borrowers remain rela-
tively uniform even in the face of such major shifts. These basic expecta-
tions resolve into one background rule: sovereign borrowers must repay, 
regardless of the circumstances of the initial debt contract, the actual use 
of loan proceeds, or the exigencies of any potential default. This is not to 
say that countries always pay; certainly, they do not. But the background 
rule remains, and it sets the standard by which creditors and others form 
their reputational judgments and against which sovereign borrowers are 
evaluated and chastised.
This repayment norm helps to immunize the debt regime from serious 
challenge and to stabilize the massive sums at stake. In particular, it 
buttresses our avoidance of prickly questions about fairness and appro-
priateness in the international economic arena. Several troubling queries 
in recent decades include: Should a black-African-led South Africa really 
be expected to repay apartheid era debt? Or, given that Saddam Hussein 
was a dictator who used funds for the oppression of a majority of Iraq’s 
population, would it be appropriate to require future Iraqi generations 
to pay for his iniquity? More generally, who counts as the “sovereign” 
in these debt situations—is sovereignty just the legal shell for whoever 
happens to control a territory, or does it imply underlying principles of 
legitimate representation or public benefi t? And how might all this fi t 
into assessments of a country’s creditworthiness?
Notwithstanding such questions, the repayment norm exerts a par-
ticular kind of power in international economic relations by shaping 
expectations of appropriate action in the area of sovereign debt. The 
rule is strengthened by its popular identity as a market principle, with 



























2  re thinking sovereign deb t
changed. A study commissioned by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) noted,
one of the major policy concerns that has deterred some transitional re-
gimes from repudiating “odious” debt from the previous regime is that of 
reputation in the capital markets; a transitional regime may be concerned 
that creditors will not in the future provide access to funds, because they 
are unable to distinguish the exceptional political decision to repudiate 
debt due to its odiousness from the general creditworthiness of the regime.1
The narrative shaping such decisions suggests that without the back-
ground rule of consistent repayment, reinforced by the disciplining mech-
anism of reputation, lending to many sovereign states would disappear. 
International debt markets in the absence of a clear cross-border en-
forcement mechanism would be too risky, requiring more information 
on sovereign borrowers’ subjective repayment proclivities than would be 
worthwhile for any creditor to collect. Although the repayment norm is 
most starkly applied in situations of regime change and transitional jus-
tice, its expectations fi lter into the prospects and bargaining positions of 
debt negotiations more generally. If repayment is expected even in such 
extreme circumstances, then debtors should certainly bear the burden in 
other situations that might emerge. By policing the boundaries of the sov-
ereign debt regime—and ensuring that such issues remain marginal—this 
rule keeps the core fl ow of capital safe and relatively free of controversy.
In this volume, I argue that the market narrative supporting the re-
payment norm is overly simplistic and in some respects entirely wrong. 
It forgets to ask key questions about the relationship between sovereign 
debt, reputation, and legitimacy over the last century—questions that 
have surprising answers embedded in the historical development of mod-
ern fi nance, with signifi cant ramifi cations for how we approach debt 
markets in the future. How have we come to think that the norm of 
sovereign debt continuity—the rule that sovereign states should repay 
debt even after a major regime change and the related expectation that 
they will otherwise suffer reputational consequences—is more or less 
unavoidable for a working international fi nancial system? Is it possible 
to think of an alternative approach—or fi nd one historically—in which 
odious debt ideas and selective debt cancellation might be incorporated 
into a functioning debt market grounded in reputational assessments? 
And if so, why hasn’t such a system developed, especially given the po-
liticized discussions of sovereign legitimacy that have taken place along-



























Open Questions in Sovereign Debt  3
The framing of repayment and reputation as a market principle—
one that disciplines debtors and creditors alike—discourages this type 
of questioning in part by propagating the following three assumptions. 
First, although creditors may assess a specifi c borrower’s political char-
acteristics through the lens of sovereign risk, judgments about a borrow-
er’s repayment decisions are not shaped by politics per se. Rather, they 
are simply the best objective assessment of a given set of material facts. 
Second, the mechanism of sovereign reputation itself is similarly free 
from subjective and historically variable political judgments. And third, 
all rational creditors are expected to respond in basically the same way 
to particular market events—especially those events that challenge the 
principle of continuous repayment. Therefore, it is not necessary to study 
the historically conditioned identities and interests of particular credi-
tors to understand how capital markets, as a whole, will respond to any 
given sovereign action. These assumptions of political neutrality, reputa-
tional stability, and creditor uniformity support an assessment that the 
basic contours of the sovereign debt regime are effectively unchangeable.
In the following pages, I contend that, far from being the stable and 
all but inevitable market principle we sometimes imagine, the debt con-
tinuity norm is intrinsically political and historically variable. It has 
been shaped over the last century by political actors, broader ideologi-
cal shifts, and changing public and private creditor structures. To begin 
with, any discussion of sovereign debt is rendered intelligible only by 
quietly incorporating a defi nition of “sovereignty” that is necessarily 
normative. Depending on the theory of sovereignty implicitly or explic-
itly adopted in international economic relations at any given time, the 
practices of sovereign debt and reputation may diverge signifi cantly. Fur-
thermore, creditor uniformity cannot simply be assumed, and in fact 
different creditors may interpret—and historically have interpreted—the 
same politicized debt repudiation in opposing ways. A close look at the 
post-World War I cases of the Soviet Union and Costa Rica suggests 
how, under conditions of market competition and ideological fl exibility, 
creditors can make rational reputational judgments in favor of post-re-
pudiation lending. The absence of similar cases later in the century re-
sulted not from rigid market certainties but instead from changes in 
creditor interactions and broader norms of sovereignty. These shifts in 
turn followed from choices by actors such as the World Bank, globaliz-
ing private banks, and the US government.
What might this theoretical instability and historical variability mean 



























4  re thinking sovereign deb t
after regime change is hardly necessary for workable reputational assess-
ments in international capital markets. Alternative approaches, incor-
porating ideas of illegitimate debt and allowing for limited cancellation, 
emerged historically and could function more fully in the future. Thus 
scholarly and popular discussions of sovereign debt have the potential 
to be much more wide-ranging than their current contours imply. That 
said, the norm is deeply embedded in international fi nance and can’t 
simply be argued away, and it is more powerful than much convention-
ally enforceable treaty law at shaping international actions. Indeed, on 
diffi cult issues like debt repayment after regime change and potentially 
illegitimate debt there is no multilateral treaty in force, even despite 
several efforts. Legal scholars and activists have attempted to resuscitate 
ideas such as a formal doctrine of “odious debt,” according to which a 
fallen regime’s debt need not be repaid if it was not authorized by and 
did not benefi t the underlying population.2 However, efforts to alter the 
repayment standards run up against already powerful practices of debt 
continuity—something of a global soft law in hiding—that have the 
predictability and compliance pull of conventional law if not its external 
trappings.
To think seriously about altering the current framework, then, it is 
necessary to recognize its theoretical supports and historical founda-
tions. In this introductory chapter, I aim to lay the groundwork for such 
an understanding. I begin by fi lling out the analytical problems with 
the conventional approach to sovereign continuity in debt and reputa-
tion, and identify opposing “statist” and “non-statist” ways of thinking 
through the question. I then highlight how we can study both the histor-
ical variation in this norm and its political underpinnings through the 
issue of odious debt. This introduction also provides an overview of the 
historical arc of my argument, which underscores that other approaches 
to debt continuity emerged in the early twentieth century and suggests 
how they were covered over by broader political and fi nancial trends 
in the latter part of the century. Finally, I discuss the role of power and 
interest in the long-term development of a norm that, over time, has ex-
ercised signifi cant power in its own right.
Problems with the Conventional Wisdom
The assumptions of neutrality, reputational stability, and creditor uni-
formity that underpin the repayment norm are, if not entirely mistaken, 



























Open Questions in Sovereign Debt  5
fully in chapter 2, a quick overview is warranted up front. To begin 
with, one of the most puzzling elements of the conventional narrative 
is the notion that the sovereign debt regime’s repayment rule could be 
apolitical. The mere mention of sovereign debt invokes one of the most 
politically controversial concepts in global affairs and international law: 
sovereignty. And perhaps unwittingly, a very distinct political theory 
of sovereignty supports the current system of international lending. In 
discussing arguments that the post-2003 Iraqi regime should be freed of 
Hussein-era debt, a Financial Times leader noted, “The principle [being 
attacked] is sovereign continuity—the idea that governments should 
honor debts contracted by predecessors. Without this, there would be 
no lending to governments.”3 Sovereign continuity means that the same 
“sovereign” remains, and thus is subject to the same contractual obliga-
tions, regardless of any internal political changes. It effectively derives 
from what I call throughout this book a strictly statist conception of 
sovereignty—the idea that the content of and changes in a state’s internal 
structure, interests, and popular support are irrelevant to its status as a 
legitimate sovereign and thus to its external relations and obligations. 
While this statist vision has deep roots in global affairs, it is heavily 
contested in legal and international relations theory, and indeed it has 
been subject to debate and alteration over the twentieth century and into 
the twenty-fi rst. In particular, the possibilities of democratic sovereignty 
or a sovereignty legally bound by constitutional norms are some of the 
non-statist concepts of sovereignty that have gained considerable trac-
tion in the international arena. An international economic regime more 
attuned to these alternative, non-statist concepts should be much more 
hospitable to something like the odious debt idea mentioned above—
and thus more amenable to noncontinuity and debt cancellation under 
certain circumstances. Indeed, I suggest that the necessity of a statist re-
payment rule for continued sovereign lending is a contestable claim. But 
what is perhaps most puzzling is the way in which, in the face of these 
multiple alternatives, a statist political theory has become so thoroughly 
embedded in the sovereign debt regime that its deeply political character 
effectively disappears.
Turning to reputation does not in and of itself provide a suffi cient an-
swer. Just as the rule of continuous repayment depends on a particular 
vision of legitimate sovereignty, the reputational mechanism support-
ing this rule takes the same implicit theoretical approach. The deter-
mination of which sovereign a reputational assessment attaches to is 
necessarily infused with a background, historically informed political 



























6  re thinking sovereign deb t
the overthrow of a dictator, be assessed as a new, untested sovereign? Or 
is it evaluated as a continuation of the previous regime? The statist and 
non-statist approaches suggest very different responses. In short, the call 
for a reputational assessment does not on its own necessitate the adop-
tion of a statist political theory. It is entirely possible to maintain the 
importance of reputational assessments in general while accepting that 
debt repudiation should not result in a lending hiatus in all cases. Far 
from leading in a mechanistic way to the repayment-as-market principle 
conclusion, reputational judgment itself is fairly fl exible. This plasticity 
suggests that the category of “excusable default”—sovereign defaults 
justifi ed by major events such as natural disasters and thus having only 
modest reputational repercussions—may be broad enough to include 
principled political defaults under certain circumstances.4 It also deep-
ens the puzzle of how the very notion of a working reputational mecha-
nism became so thoroughly intertwined with a statist insistence on debt 
continuity that the possibility of alternatives faded away.
Perhaps this all leads to the fi nal key assumption of the market princi-
ple story—that rational creditors will respond in basically the same way 
to market events, and in particular will respond in the same hostile way 
to events that challenge the rule of continuous repayment.5 Certainly, the 
norm of sovereign continuity provides something of a windfall to cred-
itors as a whole; it means that states will be expected to repay debt that 
might have been subject to cancellation under alternative sovereignty 
frameworks. But even accepting this windfall, what would account 
for the conceptual strength of a statist approach relative to all others? 
Part of what is interesting is the absence of any acknowledgment that 
non-statist concepts are entirely consistent with making reputational 
judgments. Is it possible that creditors coordinate to suppress the very 
idea that non-statist approaches are possible, including in academic and 
broader policy discussions of sovereign debt? This would be quite a feat 
of deliberate collusion—one for which there does not appear to be evi-
dence, though such fi ndings undoubtedly would be newsworthy. I fi nd 
it more likely that contemporary creditors, and those that write about 
them, have been similarly conditioned to understand the rules of repay-
ment and reputation according to a fairly narrow political theory.
But even the initial assumption of a shared creditor interest in univer-
sal repayment is problematic, and is not fully supported by the historical 
record. To begin with, it is not entirely clear that all creditors would op-
pose nonpayment in all instances. This could be the case if, for example, 



























Open Questions in Sovereign Debt  7
constituted a new sovereign, worthy of modest and appropriately priced 
investment, rather than an intransigent continuation of the previous re-
gime. Such a stance would effectively indicate a reputational assessment 
consistent with a non-statist concept of sovereignty. While a creditor 
would hardly be keen to hear such an argument from its own debtor, 
it might be more receptive to such an argument from a new potential 
client, particularly in the context of a competitive market.
Furthermore, there are historical instances in which creditors respond 
in entirely different ways to the same debt repudiation. The Soviet repu-
diation of tsarist debt, perhaps the most notorious default of the twenti-
eth century, is generally proffered as an exemplar of the reputational risk 
associated with repudiation, for example in Michael Tomz’s important 
work on reputation in sovereign debt markets.6 Read as such, it would 
support the repayment rule’s status as a uniform and historically sta-
ble market principle. However, as I argue in chapter 3, this reading, 
based principally on the fact that the new regime was unable to fl oat 
bonds on the international capital markets, overlooks key elements of 
the historical record. In fact, while creditors of the previous tsarist re-
gime remained very hostile and insistent on repayment, several newer 
American banks actually sought to facilitate long-term bond issues by 
the new Soviet government in the 1920s. These banks were halted not 
by a reputational assessment—indeed they were impressed by the Soviet 
Union’s reliable payment of shorter-term trade credits—but rather by the 
US government’s political hostility to the regime. A closer look at both 
the theory and history of creditor interaction thus demonstrates that the 
existence of a relatively uniform creditor approach to sovereign reputa-
tion cannot simply be assumed but has to be explained.
What does this mean for the solidity of the sovereign debt regime, in-
cluding its bulwark rule of repayment and its coordinating reputational 
mechanism? It is true that settled expectations and market practices 
have developed, which shut off questions of sovereign legitimacy that 
might reasonably be at the center of international lending. An equilib-
rium of sorts has been reached, and any countervailing pressure has thus 
far been insuffi cient to produce a real shift. But this does not foreclose 
the possibility that there are several potentially stable market norms—or 
multiple equilibria—that could yet develop or that might have developed 
historically under different circumstances.7 The fact that the current sys-
tem looks to many like an immutable market principle, with seemingly 
consistent creditor reputational assessments, constitutes a puzzle in it-



























8  re thinking sovereign deb t
Odious Debt as Sovereignty in Practice
Even if the market principle assumptions underpinning the contempo-
rary norm of sovereign debt continuity do not hold, where does that 
leave the repayment rule as a practical, historical matter? For any given 
sovereign borrower, international debt practices can still seem an ex-
tremely unyielding edifi ce. Nonetheless, the theoretical instability does 
point to the possibility of empirical study and encourage a closer, more 
critical look at the historical record. If we know that the current ap-
proach is inherently political and necessarily historically shaped, there 
should be a way to identify the assumptions and assessments that under-
lie a particular moment in international fi nance.
Even acknowledging the plausibility of empirical study, asking how 
the practices and reputational underpinnings of debt continuity interact 
with historically grounded ideas of legitimate sovereignty remains quite 
diffi cult in practice. The issue of sovereignty is notoriously slippery and 
does not easily lend itself to concrete examination. And accepting that 
a contested concept such as sovereignty plays an important role in any 
discussion of sovereign debt and reputation does not in itself grant access 
to its workings. Usually, the question of who might constitute the legit-
imate sovereign in economic relations remains in the background and 
is largely forgotten. States enter into and threaten to default on interna-
tional contracts fairly regularly, and the particularly political character 
of sovereign debt is rarely raised by either party.
There are certain types of debt repudiation, however, that bring these 
background matters to center stage. Central here is the issue of odi-
ous debt, which in the most common formulation arises when an ille-
gitimate regime contracts debt that is not authorized by and does not 
benefi t a nation’s people. This idea helps us think through questions 
of politics and authority in sovereign debt, and makes observable—or 
operationalizes, in the preferred language of social science—the idea of 
sovereign legitimacy underpinning the debt regime at a given moment. 
The classic legal doctrine of odious debt, fi rst developed after the Span-
ish American War of 1898 and formalized by Alexander Sack in 1927, 
states that sovereign state debt is “odious” and should not be transfer-
able to successors if the debt was incurred (1) without the consent of 
the people, and (2) not for their benefi t.8 This doctrine directly counters 
the norm of sovereign continuity in two ways, corresponding to the 
two prongs of the doctrine. It fi rst suggests that some form of popular 



























Open Questions in Sovereign Debt  9
contradicting the statist theory of sovereignty that underlies sovereign 
continuity. Alternatively, it highlights the centrality of a debt’s purpose 
by noting that any binding sovereign obligation must be entered into for 
the purpose of benefi ting the underlying people.9 As a whole, it remains 
fairly conservative—a creditor can expect to be paid so long as the 
funds are either authorized by the people or are incurred for the public 
benefi t.10 Were the doctrine to be adopted more broadly, it is likely that 
most sovereign debt incurred in the contemporary era would still be 
binding most of the time.
Although Sack’s formulation is the one cited by scholars as “the doc-
trine of odious debt,” multiple permutations are possible when we con-
sider the many available theories of governmental representation and 
legitimate state purpose.11 Indeed, recent scholarship on the idea of odi-
ous debt has frequently focused on how it might be altered and applied 
as a contemporary doctrine.12 For the purposes of this book, however, 
the key point is that all versions of an odious debt idea challenge the 
dominant statist vision of sovereign continuity in international economic 
relations. If we are concerned with the existence of a stronger represen-
tative link between a state and its people, then the idea of certain types 
of principled debt cancellation makes sense; it seems philosophically 
and legally problematic to expect a state’s people to pay back debt that 
they did not authorize and from which they derived no benefi t. In other 
words, an application of non-statist visions of sovereignty to interna-
tional economic relations suggests that debt should not be continuous in 
some cases. Conversely, if we subscribe to a strictly statist approach to 
sovereignty, then it logically follows that all debt should be repaid, even 
if it is “odious,” because popular consent and benefi t are irrelevant.
The idea of odious debt also gives us some traction in analyzing the 
historical record, by hinting that challenges to the norm of sovereign 
continuity and uniform debt repayment might be more likely in times of 
regime change. Although the enforcement of any sovereign debt neces-
sarily rests on a theory of sovereignty, usually this remains a background 
issue. However, when a regime changes, the incoming regime frequently 
seeks to distinguish itself from its predecessor, and may consequently 
seek to free itself of the predecessor’s debt obligations on the basis of 
right. Sack distinguished between proper “national debt” and the “per-
sonal debt” of a previous regime, and argued that only the former should 
continue to successors:
If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the 



























10  re thinking sovereign deb t
fi ghts against it . . . [t]his debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a re-
gime’s debt, a personal debt of the power that has incurred it, consequently 
it falls with the fall of this power.13
Broadly speaking, regime change constitutes those moments at which a 
new agent claims to represent a nation’s people. The most extreme trans-
formation involves state succession, in which there is a change of sover-
eignty over a given territory, as in the case of decolonization. A change in 
government administration stands at the opposite pole, in which there is 
a legitimate change in leadership within an existing political and consti-
tutional framework.14 For the purposes of this book, a regime change—
or government succession—is the intermediary action, in which there is 
no alteration in the most basic form of sovereignty (which remains vested 
in the same territory and people), but where there has been a signifi cant 
change in the political and constitutional structure and associated prac-
tices.15 The idea of odious debt thus provides some guidance as to the 
types of claims states may make in using non-statist concepts to prob-
lematize the norm of sovereign debt continuity. It also hints at the times 
that states are most likely to make such claims. In short, this framework 
helps us think through ways to study how modern debt practices devel-
oped toward a relatively narrow approach, that is, to so uniformly expect 
a statist continuity practice despite other possible alternatives.
Broader Politics and Creditor Competition 
in the Last Century
Even if the issue of odious debt offers some guidance as to when chal-
lenges to sovereign continuity might arise, it leaves open the questions 
of which historical period is most relevant for an empirical study and 
which factors are likely to be most infl uential in shaping understandings 
of sovereign debt. It also does not address how these elements might 
interact and the way in which power and interest, so central in the devel-
opment of global practices, play into the narrative.
To begin with, the dilemma of where to start a historically grounded 
investigation is never easy. This is especially true here, where different 
ideas of sovereignty have existed in political and legal thought and prac-
tice for a very long time. In this book, I begin the discussion in the 
early twentieth century, when questions about legitimate and illegiti-



























Open Questions in Sovereign Debt  11
prevalent on a global scale. The idea of odious debt itself developed in 
part out of admittedly self-interested US actions following the Span-
ish-American War of 1898. The Spanish Crown argued that the United 
States should assume debts that the Crown had contracted on behalf of 
Cuba. The United States refused, insisting that the debts were contracted 
by the previous Spanish regime in its own interests, which were distinct 
from and even in opposition to the interests of the Cuban population. 
As such, the United States argued, the debts were illegitimate and should 
not be transferred to the Cuban population or its new US protectors.16
As the early twentieth century progressed, such non-statist concep-
tions of self-determination and popular sovereignty spread more widely. 
The aftermath of World War I involved a major overhaul of organizing 
principles in international relations, including the beginnings of decol-
onization and a tentative universalization of the basic animating ideas 
of the American and French Revolutions. In particular, different visions 
of self-determination became ideals accessible, at least in theory, to all 
people for the fi rst time. The new normative framework was promoted 
by such ideologically divergent fi gures as Woodrow Wilson and the early 
leaders of the Soviet Revolution. This rejection of imperialism and inter-
nal forms of absolutism at the international level, along with the more 
global application of ideas of sovereign equality, poses the strongest 
historical starting point for questions of political legitimacy in modern 
fi nance. In other words, the widespread emergence of non-statist ap-
proaches to sovereignty in the early twentieth century presses the issue 
of how these concepts were received and developed in the realm of sov-
ereign debt and reputation. And the strengthening of such frameworks 
by the late twentieth century makes even more puzzling the question of 
why the norm of sovereign debt continuity, grounded as it is in contrary 
ideas of sovereignty as physical control, remained dominant in contem-
porary fi nance .17
Moving to the second question of which elements might be most in-
fl uential in actually shaping these sovereign debt practices, I argue that 
two interacting factors are especially important for understanding how 
non-statist odious debt ideas emerged briefl y and then declined in the 
decades since World War I, allowing continuity norms to develop the 
veneer of a market principle. First, I contend that the ways in which 
creditors are consolidated or competitive in their interactions and risk 
interpretations affect the degree to which non-statist approaches are ac-
cepted in sovereign debt. To the extent that creditors view each other 



























12  re thinking sovereign deb t
risk, a strictly statist insistence on continuity is likely to be dominant. 
In times when creditors are more competitive and they consider each 
other to be signifi cant risks, sovereign debt norms should be subject to 
greater contestation. Thus, although creditor uniformity is not a theo-
retical given—contrary to what is frequently assumed—the degree of 
creditor uniformity at any particular historical moment remains a rele-
vant factor. As the second key element, shifts in broader norms of sover-
eignty in the international arena affect the to which we consider odious 
debt ideas plausible in international economic relations. A strictly statist 
framework of sovereignty dominant in the world at large will support 
a similar approach in the area of debt, whereas non-statist sovereignty 
norms might problematize the rule of continuity. Although they are not 
central in every instance, broader political and legal understandings of 
sovereignty (be they statist or popular), political ideology, and insistence 
on principle are neither epiphenomenal nor merely “cheap talk.” Rather, 
they can play a central role in conditioning the initial assumptions and 
ultimate responses of key actors in any sovereign debt interaction. Given 
the multiple historical forces that shape these elements, it is diffi cult as 
a matter of general theory to make predictions on the balance between 
them. However, the basic character of this relationship is presented sche-
matically in Table 1.1:
table 1.1.  Interaction between Creditor Risk Interpretations and Norms of Sovereignty
Broader Concepts of Sovereignty in 
International Relations





Interaction / Risk 
Interpretations
Consolidated 
(Less fl exible; likely to 
insist on continuity)





(Depends on strength 
of non-statist concepts)
Competitive 
(More open to 
borrower claims)
Norm of debt 
continuity likely 
(Any default or 
repudiation likely 
made on different 
grounds)
More fl exible treatment 
& acceptance of odious 




























Open Questions in Sovereign Debt  13
An Overview of the Historical Record
What does this mean for thinking through the development of sovereign 
debt norms over the course of the twentieth century and into the twen-
ty-fi rst? The background ideas of political legitimacy grounding any 
sovereign loan or any reputational assessment come to the fore through 
claims of illegitimate debt. Although instances of debt repudiation are 
not numerous, they do suggest that the continuity norm is not prede-
termined and also highlight how creditor interaction and broader con-
ceptions of sovereignty make fl exibility more or less likely at certain 
historical junctures.
In this book, I begin the historical narrative in the tumult following 
World War I, which accompanied a rise in the non-statist concepts of 
sovereignty that should resonate with more fl exible debt practices. This 
greater ideational openness in the early part of the twentieth century 
converged with an injection of fresh competition into the international 
credit markets due to the emergence of new American banking houses. 
As surplus American capital sought investment outlets overseas, these 
relatively young US fi nancial institutions—supported by expanding US 
political interests—began to fi ght for a piece of the credit market pre-
viously dominated by British and French banks. These ambitious new 
creditors were less concerned by losses imposed on their established 
competitors, and remained more open to gaining a potentially reliable 
client even at the expense of a commitment to strict debt continuity.
The two early twentieth-century cases presented fully in chapters 3 
and 4 illustrate how these emerging principles and market structures 
resonated in the world of debt claims. In 1918, the new Soviet Union an-
nulled the foreign loans contracted by the tsarist regime, arguing effec-
tively that they constituted personal debts of the Tsar and not legitimate 
debts of the new Soviet Republic and its people. Although this alienated 
European and especially French debt holders, several New York banks 
that were newer to international lending actually attempted to facilitate 
the issuance of Soviet securities in the face of resistance from their own 
government. In 1920, Costa Rica repudiated the debts entered into by the 
previous dictator Federico Tinoco, after returning to constitutional rule 
following a two-year aberration. US Chief Justice Taft, ruling in an ar-
bitration between Costa Rica and Great Britain, distinguished between 
debt contracted for “personal” as opposed to “legitimate government” 
purposes, and held that only the latter could exist past the downfall of 
a regime. Perhaps surprisingly, the Costa Rican regime was not cut off 
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Justice Taft’s decision. The victors of World War I also seemed to refer-
ence an odious debt idea when they included the repudiation of Polish 
debt in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The treaty repudiated the debts 
that Germany had contracted on behalf of its colonies, particularly on 
behalf of Poland to fund the settling of ethnic Germans in Polish land. 
The Reparations Commission took the standpoint that “it would be un-
just to burden the natives with expenditure which appears to have been 
incurred in Germany’s own interest.”18
This ideational and material background shifted in the post-World 
War II era, as I discuss in chapters 5 and 6. Creditors were harmed badly 
during the defaults of the Great Depression. In the cautious postwar 
economic recovery, they developed closer ties with each other through 
international fi nancial institutions such as the early World Bank, pri-
vate banking integration, and global loan syndications. Creditors be-
came more consolidated in their interpretation of threat through these 
interactions, such that questioning the doctrine of sovereign continuity 
under any particular circumstance seemed more like an assault on the 
rights of creditors generally. As to ideational elements, the concept of 
popular sovereignty and the efforts to distinguish legitimate and illegit-
imate government that dominated post-World War I discourse subsided 
in the destruction of World War II. Although the new United Nations 
did support local sovereignty and self-determination, these terms during 
the Cold War emphasized a norm of nonintervention and ultimately 
leaned toward a statist viewpoint. In short, a closing in what constituted 
the interests of creditors was matched by a narrowing of the discourse 
surrounding sovereignty and sovereign debt.
The cases refl ect this mid-twentieth-century trend, and the era did not 
follow up on the potential turning point of the post-World War I period. 
The People’s Republic of China repudiated the debt of its predecessors, 
but remained marginalized in the international credit markets for de-
cades. A repudiation of many foreign fi nancial contracts followed the 
1959 Cuban Revolution, and a similar sidelining resulted in that case as 
well. The remainder of the Cold War era saw few claims of right associ-
ated with an odious debt idea. Even following major social revolutions in 
Nicaragua and Iran in 1979, as well as after a series of democratizations 
during the 1980s’ debt crisis, countries ultimately adhered to the prin-
ciple of debt continuity. The statist approach to sovereignty in sovereign 
debt, which came under question in the early twentieth century, had 
reconsolidated its dominance.
The increasing breadth and depth of fi nancial integration since the 
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than in previous eras. Still, the post-Cold War decades have also shown 
a degree of movement toward greater fl exibility in repayment norms, as 
I discuss in chapter 7. In the ideational arena, concepts of democracy 
and constitutionalism and more substantial attention to human rights 
have made headway. Although a defi nitive claim cannot yet be made, it 
is possible that the post-Cold War era and the beginning of the twen-
ty-fi rst century has witnessed a new opening in the sovereign debt re-
gime’s notions of sovereign legitimacy and continuity. The idea of odious 
debt has regained some of its earlier traction, and scholars and social 
activists have focused on the potentially problematic foundation of a 
portion of the developing world’s debt today. As for the creditor interac-
tion factor, a shift to greater use of bonds rather than bank fi nancing has 
disaggregated creditors somewhat. In addition, new sources of capital 
such as south-south fl ows and sovereign wealth funds have disrupted 
the north-south fi nancing divide of the late twentieth century. However, 
countervailing fi nancial trends exist—notably the rising importance of 
credit rating agencies and credit default swaps, all of which can unify 
the inherently multiple voices of capital into a single chorus. In short, the 
credit market structure is more ambivalent in its effect. But some possi-
bility still remains that the historical trend over the last hundred years is 
more U-shaped than unidirectional.
 Power, Interest, and Norms in Sovereign Debt
Students of international relations may raise the question here of how 
power and interest factor into into this historical narrative. As a general 
matter, I agree that actors in the global arena use “power” to further 
“interests.” However, this formulation frequently is too indeterminate 
to be especially useful, especially for understanding the development of 
long-term practices rather than for explaining singular events. In partic-
ular, it misses the role that norms themselves—expectations of appro-
priate behavior shared by a community of actors—have in shaping how 
interests are formed and how actors’ capacities are deployed. Understood 
most broadly, the work of a norm such as sovereign debt continuity ex-
ists through both the expectation or standard itself as well as the ways 
in which we understand and speak approvingly about it and the actions 
that refl ect and reinforce it. Indeed, I view expectations, discourse, and 
action as a mutually reinforcing package that develops over time and 
that therefore tends to evade ahistorical explanation.
To begin more specifi cally with questions of interest, part of my ar-
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is likely to be at any given moment. For example, one might say cred-
itors are generally self-interested and concerned with making a profi t. 
However, this does not necessarily indicate what they will interpret as 
the right course of action at a particular historical juncture. Certainly, 
as I explain in greater detail in chapter 2, it does not suggest that all 
creditors always insist on uniform debt continuity. Indeed, the wildly 
volatile trends in what is considered rational, possible, or prudent in 
international fi nancial circles bear testimony to this uncertainty.19 It is 
also possible that certain creditors have interests beyond pure profi t and 
actually embrace particular visions of sovereign legitimacy.
Even assuming a profi t motivation, I argue in part that larger, histori-
cally conditioned structures of creditor interaction are relevant to shap-
ing interpretations of interest and rational action. Individual creditors 
may well have created these larger structures—including institutions 
such as the World Bank, instruments such as syndicated loans, formal 
and informal rules, and so on—to support their own interests at a par-
ticular time. But the longer-term consequences of these frameworks tend 
to go well beyond the founders’ initial objectives as they take on a life 
and dynamic of their own. Farther down the road, these structures can 
in turn shape how the same or subsequent actors interpret their interests, 
roles, and identities in ways that would not originally have been fore-
seen. Thus, there is a necessary and mutually constitutive interaction be-
tween actors and broader institutions and norms—between agents and 
structures—that affect how interests are formed and understood.20 This 
book takes a long view of the development of debt continuity in part to 
understand this mutual construction.
Claiming that power matters is similarly indeterminate and overlooks 
a parallel dynamic. To begin with, multiple forms of power may be at 
work in a particular interaction. First, there is the understanding of 
power as the material capacity of a particular actor to shape the ac-
tions and payoffs of other actors and thus affect outcomes in its favor.21 
Certainly, such power is manifest in the international arena, as demon-
strated by the bribes and threats that sway states toward or against par-
ticular actions. However, identifying the powerful actors at any given 
moment is unlikely to result in a full explanation—even setting aside 
the above-mentioned diffi culty of identifying their ex ante interests in 
the fi rst place. Different actors at different times may have completely 
divergent understandings of how the same capacities translate into ac-
tual possibilities for action. For example, counting gunships is unlikely 
to be directly helpful in explaining why certain countries are most likely 
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still be an indirect relationship. Modern gunships now are considerably 
more powerful than they were in 1902, when the British and German 
navies sank Venezuelan ships and bombarded Venezuelan ports in part 
to enforce monetary compensation claims.22 While they would theoret-
ically be as effective against a poor and underdefended state today, this 
material capacity is no longer likely to be as useful in enforcing mone-
tary claims, due to intervening shifts in what is considered plausible or 
acceptable action. This is not to say that power understood in this way 
does not matter, or that powerful actors are not more capable of shaping 
outcomes than nonpowerful actors. Rather, physical power controlled 
by a given actor is an insuffi cient explanation for any set of outcomes 
without additional understanding of how it is situated in a particular 
context.
Relatedly, this defi nition of power as the material capacity of a specifi c 
actor is incomplete. Another more diffuse but no less effective form of 
power can exist through shared ideological structures or discourses—
ways of thinking and talking about things in a particular community 
(such as the international fi nancial community). If a given set of norms 
seems reasonable, plausible, and normal, then any actions that resonate 
with these expectations will meet with little resistance or comment. 
Conversely, practices that counter these expectations will be treated as 
radical and may be resisted. Over time, actors are more likely to make 
choices in line with these norms, further strengthening their shaping ef-
fect. The discourse and actor practice thus are mutually constitutive and 
reinforcing, making the norm appear so natural that other alternatives 
become diffi cult to comprehend. In this way, the norms themselves have 
a less visible power that can nonetheless affect outcomes and payoffs as 
effectively as any set of material capacities.
In this book, I seek to explain the foundations for the norm of sov-
ereign debt continuity, which exerts this more diffuse power in interna-
tional economic relations. The way in which we think and speak about 
debt continuity acts as a kind of global soft law, shaping expectations 
of appropriate action for borrowers and lenders alike and structuring 
key moments in debt relations today.23 This is not to say that there is 
a direct causal link between these broader ideational frameworks and 
the outcome in any given exchange. However, they enable and promote 
particular outcomes and make contrary approaches seem implausible. 
In this book, I seek to understand how the norm of sovereign debt con-
tinuity—which is always a key factor shaping contemporary debt inter-
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Conclusion
The norm of uniform repayment across all sovereign debt, regardless of 
its provenance, rarely seems puzzling to those working in the interna-
tional economic fi eld. Despite an absence of any conventional legal rule 
on the topic, the implicit acceptance of debt repayment and its reputa-
tional supports as a stable market principle covers over any lingering 
questions about the practice. However, the assumptions undergirding 
the market principle status of the norm are hardly unproblematic. Far 
from being neutral and historically uniform, sovereign debt practices 
implicate inherently political ideas and are located in necessarily vari-
able historical contexts. Indeed, such dry inquiries as “is there a reputa-
tional effect in sovereign lending” would fail to be sensical without some 
embedded vision of sovereignty—one of the most contested concepts in 
international relations today. But the norm of sovereign debt continuity 
has been so woven into the practice of international fi nance that it is 
rarely even questioned, and its controversial political character has all 
but disappeared in mainstream discussions.
The very solidity of this norm begs the questions of this book: How 
did sovereign debt continuity rise to such prominence in modern inter-
national fi nance, despite its incongruence with ideas of governmental 
rule that also spread throughout the globe over the last century? Have 
approaches emerged that unify ideas of illegitimate debt with working 
reputational assessments, and under what circumstances? The fact that 
the continuity norm has been more variable than it fi rst appears invites 
further study of how the current system developed. Moments existed in 
the post-World War I era from which alternative frameworks might have 
developed, and I suggest that both creditor interactions and broader 
norms of sovereignty shaped the emergence and outcomes of such cases. 
These two elements also affected the reduced fl exibility in sovereign debt 
and reputation in the decades that followed, and are relevant for think-
ing about how to structure economic governance in today’s unsettled 
sovereign credit markets. The issue of odious debt offers some guidance 
as to when we might see this usually hidden question of political legiti-
macy in international fi nance rise to the surface, and also helps us per-
ceive more clearly how certain material and ideational structures might 
support one norm over another in the sovereign debt regime.
In discussing these contrasting approaches in the debt arena, I high-
light the political choice inherent in the alternatives: a statist theory of 
sovereignty necessarily underpinning debt continuity, and non-statist 
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encourage normatively inclined readers to think through these ethical 
questions—as I discuss in the fi nal chapter, the policy issues are complex 
to say the least—the book’s primary purpose is not normative argumen-
tation per se. Rather, I contend that the historical contexts in which 
odious debt might be an issue offer windows into how market structure 
and broader ideologies privilege one approach over another in any given 
instance. Studying these cases across time and in relation to one another 
sheds light on the historical and political foundations for the contem-
porary norm of sovereign debt continuity and its reputational supports. 
It also casts empirical doubt on the suggestion that the practice of debt 
continuity is a historically uniform or inevitable market principle. This 
uncertainty should disquiet anyone interested in the foundations and 




























Theoretical Underpinnings of Modern Finance
And from what book of history has it been read or heard . . . that a 
king paid the debt of another king? And no mortal ever discharged 
the obligations of his enemies.
— ata-malik juvaini, thirteenth-century chronicler of the Mongol 
Empire, Genghis Khan: The History of the World Conqueror
The norm of sovereign debt continuity is so regularized in in-ternational economic relations today as to become largely un-
remarkable and taken for granted. We tend to dismiss—or even fail to 
see—the possibility of alternative approaches to sovereign debt and rep-
utation. This dismissal, it seems, derives at least in part from intellectual 
path dependence. Without a closer look at the theory or the history, it 
is easy to suppose that current debt practices are the only ones available 
and truly workable in a functioning international capital market. And 
without fully acknowledging the degree to which theories of sovereignty 
are deeply contested, it is also easy to assume that these practices are 
ideologically neutral and therefore largely unobjectionable, even if they 
may lead to troubling consequences.
While most of this book presents a new narrative of how debt conti-
nuity overcame other possibilities to become dominant over the last cen-
tury, this chapter fi lls out the theoretical background for my argument. I 
begin by more fully dismantling the assumptions of political neutrality, 
reputational stability, and creditor uniformity underlying any claim that 
blanket debt repayment is a baseline rule for a functioning international 
capital system. I highlight how conceptions of sovereignty act as prin-
cipal-agent theories in international relations, and emphasize that these 
necessarily politicized concepts are essential for any workable sovereign 
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suffi ciently fl exible to incorporate alternative non-statist approaches, 
and argue that—far from assuming creditor uniformity—we should ex-
pect to see some elasticity in creditor behavior given the complex dynam-
ics at play in debt markets.
In the second part of this chapter, I look more closely at what multiple 
ideas of sovereign legitimacy really would mean if brought into the in-
ternational debt regime, and where these ideas come from. If we accept 
that debt mechanisms are indeed more open to non-statist approaches, 
what is the range of possibilities? I take this opportunity to draw out 
the ramifi cations for sovereign debt contracts of four alternative visions 
of sovereignty with deep roots in political philosophy and international 
law. Finally, this chapter addresses how to think about case studies in 
understanding ideas of sovereign legitimacy in debt and reputation, 
building on the discussion in chapter 1 of how odious debt offers a prac-
tical window into these broader questions.
Some readers may already accept the basic openness of market prin-
ciples and reputational mechanisms in sovereign debt, the possibility of 
coherent debt practices drawn from divergent theories of sovereignty, 
and the feasibility of a careful historical study of these questions. This 
chapter is written especially for those who remain unconvinced.
Addressing the Conventional Approach
There is an easy supposition that the theoretical underpinnings of the 
contemporary sovereign debt market, including its expectation of con-
tinuous debt repayment, are fairly stable. I noted in introducing this 
book that the seeming inevitability of this baseline draws support from 
the assumption that the basic rule is politically neutral, supported by a 
clear reputational mechanism, and obliged by uniform creditor apprais-
als. But each of these conceptual bulwarks for the statist approach is 
deeply problematic.
Indispensable Politics: Sovereignty 
as the Missing Agency Question
By necessity, the controversial and highly politicized concept of “sover-
eignty”—which carries with it overtones of legitimate, or at least inter-
nationally acknowledged, rule—stands at the center of any discussion 
of the sovereign debt regime. As I noted in the introductory chapter, a 
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the lending regime. The strict rule of repayment depends upon a dis-
tinctly statist concept of sovereignty, which assumes sovereign continu-
ity within the same territory and insists on the irrelevance of changes in 
internal rule for sovereign identity. Indeed, there is no way for sovereign 
lending to exist without the unspoken adoption of one or another idea 
of sovereignty. To the extent that a sovereign debt contract exists at all, 
enforceable against future generations of a state’s people, it must at least 
implicitly rest on an underlying theory of the relationship between that 
country’s government and its people. The fact that we choose to leave 
the nature of that relationship entirely unstudied does nothing to dimin-
ish its importance.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, fi nancial writers tend to take a dim view of 
any impulse to defi ne sovereignty—and therefore implicitly sovereign 
legitimacy—in the arena of international debt. The Financial Times pre-
ferred a more “pragmatic” approach for post-2003 Iraq, arguing that 
“instead of embarking on a theological discussion of whether the debt 
contracted by Saddam Hussein is legitimate, creditors should swiftly re-
duce the country’s debt-service obligations to manageable proportions.”1 
The dominance of this ostensibly matter-of-fact approach has helped to 
address particular instances of debt restructuring, but leaves embarrass-
ingly undertheorized very basic questions. Who actually constitutes the 
ultimate principal in a sovereign contract? If it is the people, what type of 
governmental authorization is needed to make such a contract binding? 
The seemingly abstract discussion of legitimacy in fact fi lls an import-
ant and surprising gap in our practical understanding of sovereign debt 
contracts. Whereas a relatively clear theory of agency and authority is 
central to the modern practice of domestic contract law, the dominance 
of short-term pragmatism has left us with long-term practical confusion 
in the international realm.
It would help if we recognized that different theories of sovereignty 
in fact act as alternative theories of agency in the international context, 
whether or not they are expressly recognized as such. Any valid domes-
tic contract made on behalf of another entity is at least implicitly (and 
frequently explicitly) grounded in a theory of agency. And any theory of 
agency identifi es the nature of the relationship between the agent—who 
acts or enters into the contract—and the principal, the entity against 
whom the contract is ultimately enforced. Agency theory specifi es the 
conditions under which a principal will be forced to perform on the 
contract made by the agent. Usually the agent must be retained or ac-
knowledged by the principal for its actions to be respected. For example, 
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a company and ultimately the underlying shareholders (the principal), 
then the company is likely to be liable for that contract. However, any 
so-called contract made by a deranged junior employee who has taken 
the company hostage is unlikely to be respected—unless the resurrected 
company later has the opportunity to affi rm the contract—because there 
is no legitimate agency relationship in this scenario. This assumption of 
consent and ultimate ownership also underpins the expectation that the 
principal (the shareholders, collectively) will be the residual claimant in 
any fi nancial restructuring or bankruptcy proceeding, receiving only the 
leftovers once bona fi de creditors have been satisfi ed.
If the relative simplicity of this distinction between legitimate and il-
legitimate domestic contracts falls apart when we move to the realm of 
transnational sovereign debt, it is in part due to the lack of a clear theory 
of agency in the international arena. The confusion would be as bewil-
dering in domestic contract law if we insisted upon the validity of all debt 
contracts undertaken on behalf of “The Coca-Cola Company” without 
specifying who could act on behalf of Coca-Cola and under what con-
ditions. Just as we assume a defi nition of who counts as “Coca-Cola” 
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate Coca-Cola debt con-
tracts, we would need a defi nition of who counts as “Ruritania”—that 
fi ctional country of law school exams—to distinguish between legiti-
mate and illegitimate sovereign contracts signed in Ruritania’s name. In 
short, what is missing from the current discussion of sovereign debt is a 
clear idea of who counts as “sovereign” in a sovereign contract.
This is where the seemingly abstract discussion of politics and 
sovereignty becomes immediate and concrete. Different theories of 
sovereignty effectively constitute different theories of agency in the in-
ternational realm, with divergent ramifi cations for whether or not a sov-
ereign contract is legitimately enforceable. A theory of agency specifi es 
the nature of the relationship between the agent—who acts or enters into 
the contract—and the principal, against whom the contract is ultimately 
enforced. Similarly, a theory of sovereignty specifi es the nature of the 
relationship between the sovereign government—the agent who acts or 
enters into a contract—and the principal, the people against whom the 
contract is ultimately enforced. Just as different theories of agency will 
result in differential enforcement of domestic contract obligations, dif-
ferent conceptions of sovereignty should result in differential treatment 
of sovereign contract obligations. Or from an alternative perspective, 
calling any given sovereign contract “legitimate” necessarily implies and 
reinforces a particular idea of sovereignty, and thus validates the mode 
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In short, the current system of sovereign lending already, and nec-
essarily, rests on a concept of sovereign legitimacy that takes the role 
played by agency theory in domestic contract law. It serves as an unac-
knowledged support in the otherwise somewhat mysterious act of com-
plex, agent-based sovereign contract-making—that is, the conversion 
of a fl eeting promise by an individual or group of individuals into a 
permanent obligation for an entire population. Failing to discuss the 
concept of sovereignty underlying sovereign debt contracts does noth-
ing to eliminate this political choice entrenched at the very core of 
international economic law. It only leaves the system’s analytical foun-
dations unclear and undertheorized. Even if particular creditors do not 
deliberately choose one political theory over another, they participate 
in a collective practice that depends upon and reinforces a profoundly 
political judgment.
The Indeterminacy of Sovereign Reputation
Turning to reputation or creditworthiness does not escape from this 
foundational puzzle. An implicit determination of legitimate sovereignty 
is just as embedded in any reputational assessment as it is in the appraisal 
of a sovereign debt contract’s basic validity. And although an insistence 
on the strict rule of repayment seems to assume that only one analytical 
angle is possible, in fact the reputational mechanism is fl exible enough 
to incorporate a range of statist or non-statist approaches, including ap-
proaches that would allow for debt cancellation. Given the variety and 
different placement of creditors, it would be surprising for only a single 
sovereign reputational assessment to emerge.
The Positional Aspect in Reputation
This is not to reject the importance of reputation itself. Indeed, repu-
tation, broadly understood, has been put forward as a key driver for 
compliance with international legal agreements by multiple scholars.3 
The specifi c question of why states comply with international debt con-
tracts has been taken up most extensively in economics and international 
political economy, where arguments exist between those who contend 
that debt repayment results from a fear of direct retaliation, and those 
who argue that it follows from concerns about reputation.4 While an 
extensive literature review is not necessary, the evidentiary support for a 
general reputational effect in the debt arena does seem strong. Michael 
Tomz’s in-depth analysis, perhaps the leading account of sovereign rep-
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reputational factors in ensuring continued cooperation between credi-
tors and sovereign borrowers. Tomz argues that creditors consider both 
payment record and the situational context of repayment to develop be-
liefs about a borrower’s type—that is, whether it is a “lemon” that will 
default without justifi cation, a “fair-weather” that will repay only when 
times are good, or a “stalwart” that repays in good times and bad. This 
belief on the part of international investors in turn constitutes the bor-
rower’s reputation, which guides creditors’ risk assessments and lending 
decisions.5
Tomz provides a compelling argument for the centrality of sovereign 
reputation generally, and even explicitly builds political or governmental 
change into the model. He highlights that the inevitability of govern-
mental change makes reputations in sovereign debt “fragile,” in that in-
vestors will recognize that a new government may have a different policy 
preference than previous governments. They may therefore downgrade 
or upgrade a state’s reputation as a whole, depending on the actions of 
the new governmental actor.6 In this presentation of political change 
and reputation, however, Tomz accepts the basic statist understanding 
of reputation as continuous across (though also changeable by) different 
regimes. He does not consider the possibility that a new regime might 
constitute a new sovereign altogether, in need of a fully separate reputa-
tional assessment. As such, he neglects the even deeper way in which the 
content of reputation depends on broader contexts that change across 
time, place, and creditor. He falls more neatly in line with the suggestion 
that the rule of repayment, as the core of debtor cooperation in the sover-
eign debt regime, serves as something akin to a uniform and ahistorical 
market principle due to the mechanism of reputation. Tomz thus over-
looks the ways in which the practice of assessing sovereign creditworthi-
ness may well be contingent upon the assessor’s position and ideological 
inclinations.
But as Ashok Vir Bhatia points out, the limited predictability of sover-
eign economic and political behavior, as well as the absence of widespread 
robust statistical testing, “leave[s] the task of credit ratings assessments 
poorly suited to formulaic straightjackets.”7 Market research into sov-
ereign creditworthiness necessarily blends objective analysis with sub-
jective debate. Even in theoretical studies from economics and fi nance, 
there have been questions as to the degree to which reputation-formation 
and perceptions of credibility are fully uniform and “rational” in the tra-
ditional sense. Robert Frank, for example, has highlighted how emotion 
plays a key role in the formation of reputation, apart from any objective 
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perceptions of “credibility” are not a given across different professional 
groups.9 Academic economists and central bankers, for example, have 
very different views on the importance and defi nitions of “credibility,” 
and Forder contends that this has ramifi cations for the ways in which 
credibility as a concept can be abstracted for the purposes of both ac-
ademic studies and policy proposals. Jonathan Mercer draws from the 
insights of psychological theory to suggest that reputation-formation 
fundamentally links to a human tendency to attribute only negative or 
undesirable outcomes to another actor’s character or reputation. Desir-
able positive outcomes, on the other hand, become associated with the 
other actor’s situational context and thus a “good reputation” can never 
really develop.10 And Rachel Brewster considers the limits of existing 
reputational models in international law, disaggregating and temporal-
izing both the “state” and the external audience for state actions in ways 
that parallel several of the conceptual claims in this book. In particular, 
she emphasizes the shifting nature of how domestic actors value the rep-
utation of the state that they represent, and also focuses on the degree to 
which external actors account for governmental and issue variability in 
ascribing reputational consequences to state actions.11
These studies of the foundations of reputation question whether it is 
constant and objective in the sense assumed by much economic, politi-
cal, and legal analysis, and suggest that we should be looking for some-
thing other than uniformity in creditor action. It is not generally agreed 
upon that reputation is a stable factor with contours that do not vary 
across time, context, or creditor. Even accepting creditors’ basic profi t 
orientations, then, more attention should be paid to their relative eco-
nomic positions and larger social contexts. While creditworthiness may 
be uniformly important, its particular content vis-à-vis principles of sov-
ereign continuity or odious debt will still be embedded in a historically 
contingent economic and ideational framework.
The Politics in Reputational Judgment
Privileging a conceptual framework that assumes plurality rather than 
homogeneity encourages a closer look at how different approaches to 
legitimate sovereignty and debt continuity would lead to confl icting rep-
utational assessments. Just as any claim about the validity of sovereign 
debt links to a claim of who constitutes the “sovereign” in sovereign 
borrowing, any claim about sovereign reputation implicitly rests on an 
underlying political and legal theory. In particular, while a state could 
never develop a positive reputation after a repudiation on the basis of 
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reputation should necessarily result. A creditor or other international 
economic actor could reasonably understand that the willingness of a 
new regime to repay a loan depends on the degree to which its popula-
tion benefi ted from or authorized the loan.12 If a previous obligation was 
used to oppress the population or was entered into in order to facilitate 
corruption, then a subsequent regime’s willingness to repay this debt 
may not have much bearing on its readiness to pay legitimately con-
tracted or publicly benefi cial loans in the future.
Any acceptance of an odious debt idea, which might highlight the 
importance of authorization and/or public benefi t, thus suggests the 
presence or plausibility of non-statist approaches in sovereign reputa-
tional analyses. If such an argument were made and accepted by a cred-
itor after a regime change, the incoming regime would be treated not 
as a “lemon,” in Tomz’s typology, but rather as a new or unseasoned 
borrower. Conversely, a statist concept of sovereignty, supportive of the 
continuity norm, would not distinguish between legitimate and illegit-
imate debt in assessing a new regime’s repayment record as part of a 
creditworthiness analysis. In fact, a strictly statist approach would be 
most hostile to repudiation on the basis of something like odious debt, 
given that there is no acceptable economic reason for the default.13 Shift-
ing perspectives somewhat, the degree to which an implicit or explicit 
reputational assessment accepts or rejects an odious debt idea operation-
alizes the concept of sovereign legitimacy underlying reputation for any 
given creditor. The reputational interpretation and fi nancial treatment 
of a borrower as new/unseasoned rather than as a lemon indicates the 
acceptance of a more open approach to sovereignty and debt continuity 
on the part of that creditor, and an alternative politics in this area of 
international fi nance.
Thus, while I agree that “reputation matters,” such an assertion on its 
own is indeterminate for a range of politically, legally, and fi nancially 
pressing questions, given that the meaning of reputation itself is more 
open than usually acknowledged. It also fails to recognize the historical 
possibility that creditors may implicitly accept a non-statist perspective 
on debt continuity—that is, the prospect that they would make repu-
tational assessments that do not insist on debt continuity in all cases, 
while still considering creditworthiness analyses an important tool for 
capital markets. While many discussions of sovereign debt thus implic-
itly set aside (or exogenize) the actual theoretical content of sovereign 
reputation, I begin by endogenizing the idea of sovereign reputation it-
self and so locating it within broader theoretical and historical contexts. 
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non-statist approaches only makes more puzzling why the norm of debt 
continuity became prevalent in modern international fi nance.
Further Unpacking Creditor Interest
Related to the conjecture that there exists a uniform idea of reputation 
and a market principle of consistent repayment is the assumption of a 
unifi ed “creditor interest.” I noted in the introductory chapter that too 
quick a recourse to “interest” and “power” tends to result in overly sim-
plistic and ultimately indeterminate explanations. Interest depends upon 
particular circumstances and identities that may shift over time, and 
power has multiple facets, including as the often less-recognized power 
exerted by norms themselves. Still, as a general matter, capital market 
lenders might be expected to have a strong preference for maintaining 
sovereign debt continuity, given the sizable distributional consequences 
at stake. What I call a strictly statist account of sovereignty, in which the 
fact of state control is suffi cient regardless of the internal mechanism of 
control, supports the repayment of debt despite concerns about inter-
nal governmental illegitimacy. Disregarding any expectation of inter-
nal rule of law, legitimate borrowing purpose, or democratic legitimacy 
as a factor in lending and repayment would allow occasional windfalls 
to creditors. In asking why a statist norm of repayment has become so 
regularized as to appear inevitable, one immediate possibility therefore 
rests with the interest and signifi cant persuasive capacities of previous 
generations of creditors.
Such a hypothesis, while initially plausible, still offers an insuffi -
ciently nuanced view of creditor interests. In particular, this “creditor 
power” hypothesis fails to recognize that while creditors may at times 
have shared interpretations of interest and threat, tending toward debt 
continuity, such consolidation is not inevitable. At certain historical mo-
ments, creditors may well identify other lenders as primary threats, and 
look more favorably upon potential borrowers. In such situations, sover-
eign lending practices are likely to be more receptive to sovereign debtor 
concerns. To add nuance to the “creditor interest” argument, I suggest 
that the degree to which creditor interactions are competitive or consol-
idated—rather than creditor power in general—may affect the degree to 
which the rule of continuous debt repayment is stable.
We often speak of “creditors” as if they were a single roving pack, 
and to some degree this rings true. Leaving aside public creditors for a 
moment, most creditors have analogous goals—to recoup investment 
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privy to the same types of information and analysis. Frequently, cred-
itors will respond similarly to similar situations even in the absence 
of any collusion. However, it would be a mistake to ignore the fact 
that they—like all actors—are embedded in a collective world and are 
therefore both social and strategic. Their interpretations of default or 
repudiation should thus refl ect both their general social proclivities and 
their strategic positions vis-à-vis other creditors. As such, I disagree 
with Tomz and others who may argue that, in all instances, “If a gov-
ernment defaults without adequate justifi cation, it acquires a lemonlike 
reputation not only in the eyes of current investors, but also in the es-
timation of other individuals and institutions around the world.”14 Or 
more precisely, I argue that investors and institutions can differ signifi -
cantly on what counts as “adequate justifi cation” in ways that have not 
been identifi ed previously.
In fact, there is little reason to expect that creditor interests in the 
arena of sovereign debt will be entirely uniform, given that they respond 
to two principal sources of risk. First, creditors as a whole face the threat 
of default and repudiation, and in this sense have a shared perspective 
vis-à-vis sovereign debtors. Debtors, however, are not the only, or even 
the most pressing, source of risk for creditors. Other lenders constitute 
a second threat, as a healthy credit market is driven partially by com-
petition between suppliers of credit for the same borrowing client. The 
prospect of losing clients to competitors thus represents a second central 
problem for creditors.15
How might this framework interact with questions of sovereign legit-
imacy to strengthen or weaken the norm of repayment in international 
debt? As long as major creditors identify nonpayment of loans as the 
central threat in the sovereign debt market, then a hegemonic insistence 
on the payment of all debt, including potentially “odious” debt, makes 
sense.16 This effectively adopts and strengthens the purely statist polit-
ical framework of sovereignty that coincides with such a practice. This 
creditor approach should be more likely to emerge when the market is 
consolidated, that is, when the underlying material and social structures 
of creditor interactions encourage more unifi ed interests and risk inter-
pretations. In this case, creditors consider their own fate to be inter-
twined with that of their fellow creditors, and the perceived threat of 
creditor competition and client poaching recedes while that of sovereign 
state default becomes more dominant. As such, they will be more hostile 
toward debtors who refuse to pay previous loans and less solicitous of 
the views of potential borrowers. Borrowers facing a limited set of inter-
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by these creditors working together. In a consolidated context in which 
the interest of one is the interest of all, creditors will have little incentive 
to accept claims based on a non-statist view of sovereignty. Even if one 
creditor considered the odious debt argument valid, its relationship with 
other creditors, including the discontented debt holder, could prevent its 
acceptance of a more fl exible approach. Although it is diffi cult to place 
a monetary value on the exclusive adoption of a concept, the ascendance 
of a statist political theory in the sovereign debt regime—with its occa-
sional windfalls to creditors—effectively grants a conceptual monopoly 
as fi nancially valuable as any other monopoly. Over time, this concep-
tual monopoly can gain the appearance of naturalness or inevitability, 
including to creditors themselves, achieving the stable status of a market 
principle. Such a status would eventually make alternative approaches 
seem impracticable and thus shape the underlying theoretical context of 
sovereign lending in the long run.17
However, this naturalization is hardly inevitable. We can imagine that 
in a market with more competitive creditor interactions, in which credi-
tors view not only the sovereign debtor but also fellow creditors as risks, 
the preferred approach should not be so uniform. In this case, creditors 
may be more anxious to protect their links to existing clients and to 
lure new clients away from potential competitors. While the holder of a 
particular debt instrument will prefer a strictly statist repayment frame-
work as to that instrument, other creditors hoping to attract the same 
borrower may be more fl exible. A new creditor, in the hopes of displac-
ing a competitor, may be indifferent as to whether a prospective client 
pays that competitor’s arguably illegitimate loan obligation. This under-
lying desire could reasonably lead to a weaker insistence on the norm of 
sovereign continuity and a more fl exible perspective on who counts as 
the “sovereign” in sovereign debt. So long as a potential borrower looks 
like a good credit risk overall, a new creditor—considering the new re-
gime an unseasoned borrower rather than a lemon—may be willing to 
extend credit even after repudiation.18 Thus, a more competitive credit 
market should be more lenient toward sovereign governments that repu-
diate arguably illegitimate debt.
How would this dynamic play out in practice? Creditors do incorporate 
the possibility of political instability and regime change when assessing 
country risk. In this context, lenders may pay attention to sovereign le-
gitimacy if they believe that the debt contracts of less oppressive regimes 
will result in higher rates of repayment even in the absence of accepted 
odious debt ideas. However, creditors as purely fi nancial actors have no 
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internally legitimate. Under the statist background norms of the current 
fi nancial system, lenders are entitled to the repayment of all debt. There-
fore, they are unlikely to consider independently any explicit questions 
of sovereign legitimacy, at least to the extent that they are principally 
profi t-motivated. Non-statist alternatives in the debt regime are likely 
to remain in the background until pressed by a sovereign government, 
either upon repudiation or when seeking to borrow after a repudiation 
or default. As such, a creditor’s receptiveness to borrower government 
claims may well mediate the relationship between ideas of sovereign le-
gitimacy, market competition, and practices of debt continuity.
Starting from the premise of uncertain and potentially confl icting 
creditor interest, the contingent features of any given historical mo-
ment—or any given country case—should mediate the degree to which 
creditor interactions are competitive and thus receptive to alternative ap-
proaches presented by borrowers. For example, as I highlight in the So-
viet Union case in chapter 3, broader economic problems and a diffi cult 
market might heighten the belief that competitors (rather than valuable 
borrowers) constitute a principal risk. Similarly, the borrowing capacity 
or market power of a potential sovereign borrower can alter this cal-
culus, deepening rifts between creditors in a given case. Geopolitical 
struggles often provide the backdrop for overseas lending, and compe-
tition or cooperation in the political arena could also condition what 
is considered risky or logical in the economic realm. By contrast, ex-
panded social and fi nancial links between creditors, which could emerge 
through geographical integration and creditor cooperation in syndicated 
bank loans, for example, can enhance the degree of consolidation at any 
given moment. As a historical matter, each of these dynamics has been 
relevant to the construction of sovereign reputation over the last century.
In short, although creditors may proceed jointly with regard to a 
particular debt event, this is not always the case. Nor is it necessar-
ily the case that creditors should deliberately think and act together to 
strengthen a norm of debt continuity across many decades. Rather, they 
are more likely to take steps that serve particular short-term purposes, 
which when aggregated result in overall patterns of creditor interaction 
that can help to either strengthen or diminish statist debt practices over 
time. And the debt continuity norm, once emerged, may in turn affect 
creditors’ interpretations of their interests in a cyclical manner. Simi-
larly, if a noncontinuity norm were to become dominant, that would also 
shape creditors’ assessments of their own and other creditors’ interests 
and likely actions. Thus, questioning the idea of a monolithic creditor in-
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debt regime’s repayment rule, reputational underpinnings, and implicitly 
statist political ideology are more contingent than they initially appear. 
Two alternative logics exist for creditor preferences, depending on the 
nature of their interactions and interpretations of risk. The dominance 
of one or another logic remains a question of historical investigation 
rather than theoretical presupposition.
The Multiple Roles of Public Creditors
Of course, this analysis may change somewhat for public creditors, who 
have distinctive goals and concerns stemming from their more explicit 
dual role as both fi nancial players and broader norm-propagating ac-
tors. Although international creditors are frequently discussed as a sin-
gle category, public creditors’ particular motivations and organizational 
structures can affect their lending purposes and interactions.19 While the 
nuances of this difference come through more clearly in my historical 
narrative, three distinctive features bear upon the debt continuity norm 
and should be applicable to other issues of international economic gover-
nance as well: Public creditors are generally less focused on competition, 
more explicitly public-minded, and more concerned with the “power of 
the purse” than with profi t. While these features are not equally relevant 
to all public creditors, highlighting them in advance helps to identify the 
pressures at work over the last century.
One of the central characteristics of a public as opposed to a private 
creditor is its different approach to competition, and especially its lower 
competitiveness relative to market actors. In particular, the publicness 
of these lenders obviates the way that market competition, absent any 
contrary consolidative pressures, encourages efforts to solicit and retain 
borrowers. The classic public actor is established not out of a profi t mo-
tive but rather to instantiate some broader goal or idea of the public 
good.20 As such, public lending results in a different relationship with 
debtors and with the sovereign credit market as a whole. With regard 
to their potential borrowers, these creditors’ ideological perspective and 
relative lack of concern with profi t will make them less inclined to court 
potential borrowers by giving greater credence to their independent 
viewpoints and claims. They may be less willing to think seriously about 
the degree to which reluctance to make payments on previous, arguably 
illegitimate debt actually predicts the likelihood that comparatively le-
gitimate loans will be repaid in the future. Although public creditors 
(as with most explicitly political actors) should want to keep borrowing 
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their own outlook or ideological position as a result of borrower pres-
sure. In short, the legitimacy claims and other substantive arguments of 
a borrower could, paradoxically, fall on less receptive ears.
In addition to this basic motivational difference, public creditors are 
rarely part of a very large market of similar actors, with similar goals, 
providing similar services. Because of their distinct and sometimes 
highly individualized goals in lending, any competition between public 
creditors that does exist will take on a different cast. Public lenders (and 
public actors more generally) will be less concerned with the actions of 
other creditors as competitors for the same borrowers, although they 
may view such creditors as a threat to their own policies or goals and 
challenge them on this front.21 As I discuss in the following chapter, 
this was the case to an important degree in successful US governmental 
efforts to prevent American banks from fi nancing the Soviet Union after 
its debt repudiation at the end of World War I. The normative position 
taken by public creditors may be enhanced and eventually naturalized 
if there is little competition from alternative, private sources of fund-
ing—as was the case with World Bank lending in post-World War II 
international fi nance. Such oligopoly will make public creditors even less 
open to borrower claims, and thus can further close off the potential for 
borrowers’ assertions about sovereign legitimacy to make any headway.
Whereas general publicness tends to minimize the way in which com-
petition can make creditors more open to borrower claims, the more 
overt public-mindedness of such actors cuts in both directions. Pub-
lic creditors have a unique dual role in international lending, as both 
participants in the broader credit market and as norm-generating and 
norm-enforcing actors in their own right. This explicitly social outlook 
may involve an ex ante commitment to ensuring that public resources 
benefi t a state’s underlying population, or to promoting the rule of law 
or more democratic forms of sovereignty. In this case, a public credi-
tor’s position as a noncompetitive and even monopolistic or oligopolistic 
actor would be overshadowed by a deeper commitment to particular 
political values. This is the case for certain contemporary creditor coun-
tries, such as Norway, which have taken the lead in propagating odious 
debt ideas, as I note in chapter 7. On the other hand, a commitment to 
imperial projects or to an ideologically based economic policy vision 
(such as communism or capitalism) could undermine attentiveness to 
questions of legitimate sovereign statehood, as I discuss with regard 
to the mid-twentieth century and the Cold War in chapter 5. In short, 
rather than understanding these actors as creditors whose outlook is 
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make sense to focus on them fi rst as public actors whose credit activities 
serve larger public goals.
Finally, the power of the purse, which holds public creditors account-
able to their funders, may well shape their ultimate viewpoints.22 This 
power is likely to be especially strong because the interests of borrowers 
are less of a countervailing force. Whereas a private creditor balances 
the demands of its own investors (generally for higher rates of return) 
with those of its borrower clients,23 public creditors may be less con-
cerned with the independent views of debtors due to the noncompet-
itive dynamic noted above. While this funding element can reinforce 
the public-mindedness just discussed—after all, those who launch and 
fund a public creditor presumably do so for a social purpose—this effect 
is hardly absolute or permanent. Although a public creditor’s founding 
members formulate its initial goals, they may also establish a funding 
structure that renders the creditor dependent on external actors whose 
interests are in tension with those original goals.24 As I discuss in chapter 
5, this analytical framework helps to make sense of why the early World 
Bank ultimately adopted a strictly statist approach for its own lending 
and creditworthiness analyses.
In short, to speak of creditors as a single group in sovereign lending 
is not only historically problematic but also theoretically untenable. Al-
though greater uniformity may exist at particular moments, the com-
petitive pressures on private creditors and the unique characteristics of 
public creditors mean that these moments should provoke additional in-
vestigation rather than simply solidify preexisting assumptions. Neither 
creditor uniformity, nor the mechanism of creditworthiness, nor a claim 
of political neutrality is suffi cient explanation for the market principle 
expectation of continuous debt repayment. This leaves us with unan-
swered questions as to how sovereign debt and reputation can be under-
stood as a theoretical matter, and why it has been framed in particularly 
narrow ways as a historical matter.
Alternative Sovereignties and their Ramifi cations
If the norm of debt continuity cannot be accepted as a neutral mar-
ket principle with which all reasonable people must agree, nor does it 
emerge from the idea of rulership itself. In the current international sys-
tem, the mechanisms of sovereign rule are tied to, and perhaps hidden 
by, the trappings of statehood. But imagine a world of personalistic rule, 
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with defi nite, if unpredictable, mortality. A conquering sovereign in this 
world might take over a rival’s territory, neutralize his descendants, de-
stroy his monuments, and otherwise banish memories of the previous 
rule. If the creditors of the deposed ruler approached the new sovereign 
requesting payment of the previous regime’s debt, they might be as likely 
to leave without their heads as with their principal plus interest.
While this hypothetical is somewhat extreme, it is far from a fan-
tasy, as versions of such personalistic dominion have existed through-
out human history. An incident recorded by thirteenth century Persian 
chronicler and Mongol bureaucrat Ata-Malik Juvaini highlights how 
expectations of noncontinuity might seem reasonable under these alter-
native forms of rule. When Mengü (grandson of Genghis) was elected 
Great Khan by an assembly of Mongol princes in 1251, the debts of his 
predecessor and fi rst cousin Güyük were presumptively erased, notwith-
standing the family connection and the relatively orderly nature of the 
succession.25 A discussion of appropriate debt practices resulted from an 
appeal by certain of Güyük’s creditors, whose “cause was lost” but who 
nonetheless approached the new ruler, “partly hoping for his justice and 
partly despairing.” Juvaini notes that “all the functionaries of Court 
and Pillars of State were of [the] opinion that there was no obligation to 
pay the amount due . . . and that no mortal would have cause to object.” 
After all, “from what book of history has it been read or heard from 
reciters that a king paid the debt of another king? And no mortal ever 
discharged the obligations of his enemies.” That Mengü ultimately did 
compensate the creditors for the debts of his predecessor was consid-
ered—far from the creditors’ right—evidence of the new Great Khan’s 
generosity and noble character.26
The fi nancial context of the Mongol era differs radically enough from 
our own that few direct lessons can be drawn from this anecdote. But it 
is telling that economic advisors of civilizations past might have scorned 
the expectation that a new government—particularly one antagonis-
tic to the previous regime—should make good on all its predecessor’s 
debt. Episodes in later centuries, several of which I discuss at length 
in this book, suggest continuing distaste for discharging the obliga-
tions of enemies. The restored Mexican republic repudiated the debts 
of the French-supported Hapsburg emperor Maximilian in 1867, “on 
the ground that they were contracted for the purpose of combating the 
constitutional government.”27 In 1868, the fourteenth amendment of the 
US Constitution voided outstanding civil war debts “incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States.”28 The Costa Rican 
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idea of paying the debts of another. These episodes highlight how, as the 
meaning of “sovereign” becomes less personalistic and more associated 
with abstract statehood, the idea that debt can permanently attach to a 
governmental entity becomes plausible. But they also demonstrate that 
pressure can build to authenticate the legitimate character of the bor-
rowing regime in question.
At the center of the debt continuity norm, then, is neither market disci-
pline, nor the idea of governmental rule per se, but rather the ephemeral 
and multifarious idea of sovereignty itself. Although fi nancial writers 
might use the term “theological” dismissively in referring to contempo-
rary discussions of debt legitimacy, in many ways the term is fi tting.29 
Political theorists have pointed out that underlying the modern structure 
of international relations is a secularized theology or metatheory of the 
sovereign state.30 Just as theology deals with the nature of god and its 
relationship to man, this secularized theology of the sovereign state spec-
ifi es the nature of the state and its relationship to the people. Principal 
among these theological exports has been the idea of a unitary and om-
nipotent god, transformed into the absolutist or “command” theory of 
a unitary and omnipotent sovereign state. But, as the following discus-
sion makes clear, this statist politics of sovereignty, a version of which 
underlies the doctrine of sovereign continuity, is not the only possible 
approach to sovereignty or sovereign contracting. Indeed, the Western 
philosophical tradition grounding current international relations pro-
vides a range of competing ideas based in popular, rule-of-law, and out-
come-oriented theories. And these alternatives, all of which have found 
defenders through the last century, may well fi t more comfortably with 
our current sensibilities.
Who Can Sign? The Statist Roots 
of Contemporary Debt Contracts
Where does the statist idea of sovereignty embedded in current lending 
norms come from, and how deep does it go? In this absolutist concep-
tion, the sovereign is simply the juridical body that has ultimate control 
and authority over a given people and territory, and that issues com-
mands within that territory in the form of general laws and sui generis 
orders. This sovereign is functionally similar and juridically equal to 
other sovereigns, and the structure and legitimacy of its internal consti-
tution, culture, and stage of development are conceptually irrelevant to 
its external relations. This framework conceives of the sovereign state 
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no law or higher authority and equal only to other states. It might also 
be understood as the latter-day incarnation of an absolutist, divine, or 
militarist conception of rulership, updated to fi t modern defi nitions of 
states as territorially bounded.31
In Western political theory, Jean Bodin provided perhaps the fi rst of 
these explicit accounts, by defi ning sovereignty in the sixteenth century 
as “the highest power of command” and “the absolute and perpetual 
power of a commonwealth.”32 This tradition was carried forward by 
Thomas Hobbes and Benedict de Spinoza, both of whom considered the 
sovereign as constituting the supreme law-making authority, free from 
limitation on its actions.33 In this view, it does not matter how the gov-
ernmental entity claiming sovereign status gains control. It may do so 
by liberal democratic means, by other constitutional means, or by force 
alone—the strictly statist requirements for sovereign action pay little 
attention. As Bodin makes explicit, “If [power is taken] by force, [the 
government] is called a tyranny. Yet the tyrant is nonetheless a sovereign, 
just as the violent possession of a robber is true and natural posses-
sion even if against the law, and those who had it previously are dispos-
sessed.”34 Although Hobbes distinguished between sovereignty by force 
and sovereignty by voluntary institution, he insisted that “the rights and 
consequences of sovereignty are the same in both.”35
This tradition carries into legal and constitutional theory as well, as 
represented by the classical positivism of John Austin, who understood 
law as the command of the sovereign backed by force.36 And in his for-
mulation of positivist international law in 1912, Lassa Oppenheim sim-
ilarly rejected the moral foundations and judgments implied by natural 
law accounts.37 In denying the relevance of internal culture, religion, 
or political form, he sought to organize international law on the basis 
of sovereign equality and state consent. Or in the preferred metaphor 
of international relations theory, this account of sovereignty conceives 
of the state as a “unitary black box” whose internal machinations are 
irrelevant to its foreign interactions.38
This principle of recognizing sovereign governments on the basis of 
command or effective control was accepted as a central principle of 
modern international law by early members of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. For example, J. B. Moore, a prominent American 
jurist and member of the Court, wrote in the early 1900s,
The origin and organization of government are questions generally of in-
ternal discussion and decision. Foreign powers deal with the existing de 
facto government, when suffi ciently established to give reasonable assur-
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state in its ability to maintain itself, and discharge its internal duties and 
its external obligations.39
This essential commitment to disregarding internal differences and the 
possibility of internal coercion is enshrined in the basic legal principles 
of twentieth-century international relations—equal sovereignty and the 
doctrine of nonintervention, as highlighted in Article 2 of the UN char-
ter. International or “external” sovereignty in this statist approach is 
thus based on effective control and recognition by the community of 
states. As a consequence, it pays little attention to the potential internal 
dimensions of sovereignty.40 The central contours of this statist frame-
work have remained fairly stable into the turn of this century.41
How would this paradigm translate into a theory of agency or author-
ity to enter into contracts? The answer here is relatively straightforward: 
whoever exercises control may sign the sovereign contract. And because 
the state’s population is not considered the “principal” of the state in any 
true sense, no real agency problem exists. The core relationship between 
the people and the government is not characterized as one of principal 
and agent but rather, in the language of John Austin, as one of “sover-
eignty and subjection.”42 The people under this theory of sovereignty are 
ultimately “subjects” of the state, who are subject to the commands and 
obligations of whichever government successfully controls them. This 
political theory should look familiar to those working in international 
capital markets today: regimes that rule by force, exploit local commu-
nities, and violate their own laws may still enter into international agree-
ments under statist norms.
Who Can Repudiate? The Rise of the Eternal Sovereign
So, we know that even widely disparaged governments may enter into 
internationally binding obligations according to statist political thought. 
But the second key question is whether a successor regime must be 
bound by that prior regime’s actions under this approach or whether, in 
the alternative, the successor still has a presumed right to disclaim the 
debt. There are two opposing answers to this question even within the 
statist framework, which in the Western tradition corresponds to a split 
between late medieval thought and the high modernism of the Scientifi c 
Revolution.
The fi rst approach, associated with late medieval political theory, in-
sists on the eternal nature of the state apart from any changes in actual 
rulership, and thus considers sovereignty to live forever. In the early and 
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into the eternal/transcendental and the temporal/profane realms. While 
a ruler derived legitimacy from the eternal divine, he himself was a tem-
poral being. With the shift away from this dualist aspect of the late Mid-
dle Ages, however, space emerged for an intermediate arena in which 
earthly beings—such as states—might yet have eternal duration. Thus, 
previewing more contemporary jurists and fi nancial actors, the late me-
dieval legal theorist Baldus di Ubaldi argued, “A realm contains not only 
material territory but also the peoples of the realm . . . And the totality 
or commonweal of the realm does not die, because a commonweal con-
tinues to exist even after the kings have been driven away. For the com-
monweal cannot die . . . it lives forever.”43 Although Bodin is rightly cited 
as an early modern political theorist for insisting that sovereignty may 
be claimed by undisguised force rather than through divine blessing, on 
the question of sovereign continuity he hearkens back to this earlier age. 
Bodin considered both sovereignty and the status of the “sovereign” to 
be perpetual, transferring to whoever gains effective control of a state’s 
territory.44 Jens Bartelson emphasizes that this combination of state con-
tinuity with ruler discontinuity is an essential aspect of what he calls the 
“proto-sovereignty” of the late medieval era. “The body politic could be 
accounted for as something ontologically separate from the existence of 
the ruler within it, yet as something continuous, transcending the life of 
the ruler in time and space.” He emphasizes the importance of this move, 
in which “we witness the fi rst steps towards a theory of inalienability, 
which implies a set of rights well separated from those of the individual 
king.”45 Along with these inalienable rights of the eternal state, it would 
seem, can come inalienable obligations. In this premodern framework of 
the eternal state, sovereign obligations might remain even in the case of 
major regime change. Although medieval scholars intended this vision 
of sovereignty to be secular, to many contemporary political theorists it 
retains “a whiff of incense from another world.”46
Despite this particular historicity and provenance, the doctrine of sov-
ereign continuity is very much alive in practice today. Echoing Baldus in 
the fourteenth century, J. B. Moore in the early twentieth clearly links 
the status of sovereign to the theory of sovereign sempiternity, and then 
to the continuity of contractual obligations:
Changes in the government or the internal policy of a state do not as a rule 
affect its position in international law. . . . though the government changes, 
the nation remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired. . . . The prin-
ciple of the continuity of states has important results. The state is bound 
by engagements entered into by governments that have ceased to exist; the 
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The Financial Times continues the trend into the twenty-fi rst century in 
its insistence—without irony—that we avoid “theological” discussion 
and simply accept the eternal nature of states for the purposes of enforc-
ing debt obligations. At least in contemporary international fi nancial 
circles, the innovation of late medieval jurists lives on.
Notwithstanding its remarkable resilience, the theoretical innovation 
of unbroken sovereignty did not stand alone in the early modern tradi-
tion of Western political thought. The opposing approach, associated 
with Hobbes and the high modernism of the Scientifi c Revolution, insists 
more explicitly on the sovereign’s absolute right to do as it pleases, which 
would include contract repudiation. Although he shared Bodin’s indif-
ference to competing forms of internal rule and the mechanism of gain-
ing sovereign power, Hobbes very explicitly considered his work to stand 
upon a more materialist conception of the universe. Drawing inspiration 
from the revolution taking place in the natural sciences in mid-seven-
teenth-century Europe—and keenly aware of the ravages wrought by the 
religiously inspired Thirty Years War—Hobbes rejected both religious 
foundations and any Platonic idea of eternal essences in formulating his 
political vision. He insisted instead that “every part of the universe is 
body, and that which is not body is no part of the universe.”48
Perhaps unsurprisingly, he took a fairly materialist view of sovereign 
existence and power, including in times of succession. Unlike the late 
medievalists and Bodin, Hobbes did not consider that sovereignty could 
exist forever, ungrounded from actual rulership. He was especially con-
cerned with clarity in sovereign succession precisely because without 
this the choice would be uncertain, and “then is the commonwealth dis-
solved” and “the multitude [left] without any sovereign at all.”49 Hobbes 
joined this materialism with an insistence on the sovereign’s indivisible 
right to determine the means necessary to promote the interests of the 
commonwealth and its subjects. Thus sovereign power is absolute, “as 
great as possibly men can be imagined to make it.”50 This is not to say 
that the sovereign cannot constrain its own actions and encourage stable 
interaction by promulgating laws and binding itself through contracts. 
Although Hobbes was primarily concerned with the prospect of civil 
disorder and internal constraint, this ability to bind would presumably 
extend to the realm of external contracts as well. However, these con-
straints would always be contingent and subject to repudiation on the 
basis of sovereign status and power alone.51
While Hobbes is rightly considered foundational to modern thinking 
about sovereign states, an adoption of his strictly materialist approach 
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dominant practices. The debt continuity norm in modern international 
fi nance owes its existence to older, more religiously grounded strains of 
thought in the Western philosophical tradition. In its legal and norma-
tive expectation that states never die, the contemporary economic frame-
work adopts the version of continuous statism associated with Bodin 
and late Medieval scholars. In this view, each new ruler or regime is not 
granted a clean slate on which to make decisions (or build a new repu-
tation), but rather is assumed to be the reincarnation of an indefi nitely 
ongoing sovereign existence.
An Alternative Authorization Grounded in the People
Perhaps the most vocal competitor to a statist politics of sovereignty 
today is the idea of popular or democratic sovereignty. This broader ide-
ology, which has become increasingly prominent over the last century, 
has markedly opposed consequences when translated into the sovereign 
debt regime. In this framework, sovereignty ultimately lies with a “sover-
eign people,” whose authorization provides legitimacy to the state and its 
external interactions. Both the sovereign state and the laws it promulgates 
are valid only if they refl ect the consent of the underlying population. The 
mechanism by which this consent fi nds expression is not specifi ed, and 
may be direct or through representation. We can even imagine, at the 
outer edges of popular sovereignty, the possibility of a consensual mon-
archy. The key is that the state as a secularized deity has been dethroned, 
and now is subject in some way to the ultimately sovereign people. Under 
this approach, not all states are properly or equally “sovereign” simply 
by virtue of their territorial command. The evaluation and recognition of 
true sovereignty—and therefore of valid sovereign obligation—requires 
the consideration of a regime’s internal practices.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau stands as a central thinker in this approach. 
Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, he conceived of a “sovereign 
will” founded in a social contract as providing a form of government 
“by means of which each one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys 
only himself and remains as free as before.”52 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès 
followed in insisting on the unity of the nation with the people in the 
context of the French Revolution. “The Third Estate [the order of the 
common people as distinct from nobility and clergy] thus encompasses 
everything pertaining to the Nation, and everyone outside the Third Es-
tate cannot be considered to be a member of the Nation.”53 Thomas Paine, 
also refl ecting upon the French Revolution and equating the nation with 
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mankind, and the source of misery, is abolished; and sovereignty itself is 
restored to its natural and original place, the nation.”54 The commitment 
to basic self-legislation found expression in the work of Immanuel Kant 
as well, although Kant understood self-legislation primarily as “free-
dom from tutelage” in the realm of thought.55 This attentiveness to the 
relevance of a state’s internal makeup also resonates with the Liberal 
school of international relations theory, which explains the international 
behavior of states on the basis of their internal characteristics.56
The idea of a sovereign government as fundamentally grounded in the 
consent or authorization of the people has translated fairly smoothly 
into an admittedly controversial principle of international law. In this 
view, a sovereign state may be legally recognized—and thus capable of 
valid international action—only if the state is constituted by popular 
means. Woodrow Wilson in particular is associated with this discourse 
of international interaction, due to his stated commitment to the prin-
ciple of self-determination in the League of Nations and his own ad-
ministration’s refusal to recognize governments claiming sovereignty by 
force.57 While still grounded in the limitations provided by state struc-
tures and territorial boundaries, this approach resonates with the Cos-
mopolitan school of political theory and international law, which puts 
individual rights at the center of any legitimate polity or legal system. It 
is manifest in the emerging language of international judicial decisions 
and foreign policy, which Ruti Teitel analyzes as “humanity law.”58 The 
strong version of this approach presents a vision of consent, sovereignty, 
and human rights that is in deep tension with a statist concept of sov-
ereignty as command. Modern day champions of a Wilsonian ideal of 
sovereign legitimacy, such as Michael Reisman, continue to promote this 
view of a “new constitutive, human-rights based conception of popular 
sovereignty.”59 Some legal scholars, such as Thomas Franck, have gone 
so far as to insist that contemporary international law in fact contains 
an emerging right to democratic governance.60
This democratic or popular framework of sovereignty suggests a 
unique relationship between the people and state legality and legitimacy. 
Unlike the statist conception of sovereign as command, in which law 
is imposed by force on a subject people, here the people themselves are 
sovereign and thus exist prior to the law. Rousseau makes clear that the 
people acting as sovereign are free even from the constraints of their 
own prior laws, as “it is contrary to the nature of the body politic that 
the sovereign impose upon itself a law it could not break.”61 Sieyès dis-
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that provides the authorization for governmental action. “Government 
can exercise real power only insofar as it is constitutional. It is legal only 
insofar as it is faithful to the laws imposed upon it. The national will, 
on the other hand, simply needs the reality of its existence to be legal. 
It is the origin of all legality.”62 Thus, law and valid government action 
exist, but in a very different form than that found in other approaches 
to sovereignty.
How would this paradigm translate into a theory of agency or author-
ity to enter into contracts? Authority should derive from the sovereign 
people—now properly understood to be the principal in any sovereign 
contract—either acting directly or through their representatives. Govern-
ment offi cers act as their agents, and so long as they act according to the 
roles assigned to them or the mechanisms established by the underlying 
people, they have authority to bind the sovereign nation. In this frame-
work, the people are subject only to those contracts that their authorized 
agents have entered, once they have been constituted as “sovereign.”
In this approach, sovereign obligations, properly understood, do not 
exist unless they have actually been properly authorized by the popu-
lation. A regime change in which a democratic sovereign government 
comes into being after a period of rule by other means would effectively 
constitute the fi rst appearance of a legitimate sovereign government. 
The previously existing government would not in fact have comprised 
a proper sovereign state, but only a private form of rule imposed on the 
underlying and disempowered sovereign people. Therefore, regimes that 
rule by force would not be able to enter into international agreements 
that bind the population after their fall. And if sovereignty is conceived 
under this more democratic or popular framework, creditors who lend 
to such regimes cannot expect to be repaid after a regime change. This 
is not necessarily to say that all previously existing obligations would be 
repudiated. On the contrary, they would likely be evaluated by the newly 
empowered sovereign on a pragmatic basis. However, this pragmatic ap-
proach is very different from that implied by the doctrine of sovereign 
continuity, which presumes the perpetual nature of any sovereign obliga-
tion on the basis of strictly statist assumptions about sovereignty.
Sovereign Authorization Delimited by Law
Although the tension between strictly statist and popular conceptions 
of sovereignty is perhaps most well known, an intermediate alternative 
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law” or constitutional sovereignty. Like popular sovereignty, this school 
pays attention to internal modes of legitimation in recognizing valid sov-
ereign action. However, it does not require that this internal authoriza-
tion ultimately come from the underlying people. The sovereign state 
exists and is both empowered and limited by its internal constitution or 
rule of law, whether or not it is democratic. Thus, an internal rule-of-law 
or constitutional framework that denotes a nonconsensual monarchi-
cal or other nondemocratic political order would be suffi cient to autho-
rize—and render presumptively binding—sovereign action.
This concept of sovereignty is not as well developed into a coherent 
school of political theory as strictly statist or popular sovereignty. How-
ever, it relates to Max Weber’s basic insight that the use of force is not 
a means specifi c to states alone, and that therefore force cannot be the 
sole defi ning characteristic of statehood. Writing in the early twentieth 
century, Weber thus modifi ed the basic defi nition of a sovereign state 
to include the element of legitimacy; a state in this view is “a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory.”63 Unlike democratic or 
liberal theorists, Weber himself did not insist on any substantive inter-
nal requirements for this ultimate legitimacy, and considered that dif-
ferent types of domestic regimes would be consonant with legitimate 
statehood.64 Perhaps the paradigmatic legal theorist working in this ap-
proach was Hans Kelsen, who sought to identify and understand law 
as “pure”—a separate and internally coherent order independent from 
politics and morality.65 Kelsen follows John Austin in separating valid 
law from moral questions, but differs in that he does not consider law 
to be ultimately reducible to force. Rather, the promulgation of acts and 
statutes by a sovereign government can only be identifi ed as legally valid 
within the context of that state’s own internal norms or legal rules, which 
in turn build from the basic norm (grundnorm) or constitution of that 
polity. This basic norm itself “cannot be derived from a higher norm,” 
but instead “constitutes the unity in the multitude of norms by represent-
ing the reason for the validity of all norms that belong to this order.”66 
Kelsen sought to provide law with the clearest possible “decision rule,” 
emphasizing law as an autonomous and internally coherent order and 
thus granting it objectivity and stability. In so doing, he hoped to in-
sulate it from the subjectivity and uncertainty inherent in the concept 
of law as sovereign command—whether the sovereign be an individual 
ruling by force or the people as a whole. In this, Kelsen foreshadowed 
Hannah Arendt’s political commitment to a constitutional system of 
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potential extremism that could arise in both absolutist rule and pure 
popular sovereignty.67
The rule-of-law or constitutionalist conception of sovereignty as de-
termined and limited by internal norms or rules of law can translate into 
the international realm as well. In this framework, international law 
and international affairs would remain interested in questions of inter-
nal state legitimacy. However, this approach would not investigate the 
substantive democratic legitimacy or internal human rights compliance 
of governments. Rather, it would focus on ensuring states’ commitments 
to a more procedural vision of rule of law in both the domestic and 
international spheres. Conservative early twentieth-century American 
lawyers, including Supreme Court Justice (and former president) Wil-
liam Howard Taft, were at the forefront of this rule-of-law approach in 
the international arena.68
How would this paradigm translate into a theory of authority to enter 
into external debt contracts? Authority should derive from a vision of 
the sovereign as constituted and limited by law, so a government actor 
could act on behalf of the state as a whole, including its people and terri-
tory, as long as it follows the domestic legal framework. Even the govern-
ment offi cial who originally promulgated the law under which he or she 
acts must then stay within its purview, as any actor is ultimately subject 
to the law itself. Kelsen presents this dynamic of law-making author-
ity and subjection to law as follows: “Only a competent authority can 
create valid norms; and such competence can only be based on a norm 
that authorizes the issuing of norms. The authority authorized to issue 
norms is subject to that norm in the same manner as the individuals are 
subject to the norms issued by the authority.”69 Given this fundamental 
commitment to rule of law (or basic constitutionalism) as such—as dis-
tinguished from an adherence to liberal democratic constitutionalism, 
for example—neither the particular internal form of the state nor the 
substantive content of rules and laws are important. So long as internal 
rules are followed, the appropriate government offi cial can act as an 
agent for the sovereign state, thus binding the territory and population 
under that state’s legal framework.
Under this approach, sovereign obligations exist and are continuous 
if they have been validly authorized under the internal legal frame-
work, even if that internal framework is distasteful according to some 
moral standards. If the proper internal rules were followed, the sover-
eign obligation stands whether the previous regime was autocratic or 
democratic. Thus, a regime change in which a democratic government 
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existence of a sovereign obligation, so long as that obligation was val-
idly incurred under the internal rules of the previous contracting regime. 
Therefore, even a nondemocratic regime may enter into international 
agreements that bind the underlying population, so long as it specifi es 
and then follows its own laws. And if sovereignty is conceived through 
this rule-of-law framework, then creditors who lend to nonrepresenta-
tive regimes may still expect repayment if they carefully respect that re-
gime’s internal constitution and rule of law. In short, this conception of 
sovereignty modifi es somewhat the strictest doctrine of sovereign conti-
nuity. Sovereign obligations persist, regardless of regime form or regime 
transformation, so long as the internal rule of law in place at the time of 
the contract is respected by both parties to the contract: the sovereign 
government and the external contracting party.
Sovereign Action as Outcome-Oriented
The three schools discussed above present visions of sovereignty that 
are ultimately process oriented—they interrogate the relationship be-
tween the ruler and the ruled in a given state and underscore the proce-
dures of sovereign contracting that this relationship entails. However, 
a discussion of the political concepts underlying sovereign debt may 
also focus on the outcome of such contracts. An outcome orientation 
in sovereign contracting would require that valid sovereign action be 
in the interests of the state, broadly understood. This orientation is not 
at all exclusive to any one of the three different procedural schools of 
sovereignty discussed above. Indeed, the internal procedures by which 
a sovereign action is decided or acted upon are conceptually unrelated 
to this approach; the action could be undertaken according to absolutist 
or democratic means, either following or disregarding the internal rule 
of law. What matters instead is attentiveness to the ultimate outcome 
or intended benefi ciary: a given sovereign state itself, rather than those 
who act in its name.
This outcome orientation is, at least potentially, entirely complemen-
tary with either of the statist, popular, or rule-of-law accounts. Indeed, 
each of these process-based approaches may be understood as part of 
the larger metaparadigm of statehood characteristic of the modern era, 
which conceives of sovereignty as limited to an established (if expand-
able) territorial boundary. This geographical groundedness counters ear-
lier ideas of a personalized sovereign ruler unifying an essentially private 
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sovereignty not only grounded sovereign statehood in a given geographic 
realm, but also attempted to strip the now explicitly public state from 
its association with rulership as private ownership.70 In place of the lan-
guage of personal domain, modern discourse substitutes the language 
of commonwealth, public protection, and state interest. Hobbes, who 
insisted on there being no distinction in the basic sovereign rights of an 
“instituted” as opposed to an “acquired” sovereign, still postulated the 
initial existence of the sovereign state itself in terms of the security and 
order of the underlying commonwealth. Bodin, among the most abso-
lute of the traditionalist thinkers, shared this language of the sovereign 
state as “commonwealth” rather than disconnected private domain. The 
concept of modern statehood as linked to internal responsiveness is even 
clearer in the popular and rule-of-law visions of sovereignty.
Several thinkers of the early to mid-modern period thought fairly ex-
plicitly about the relationship of sovereignty to sovereign debt through 
this model of basic responsiveness to underlying public interest. Pre-
viewing arguments afoot today, they warned that sovereign debt or 
“public credit” could make government offi cials overattentive to the 
needs and desires of creditors, and also enable them to embark upon 
understudied misadventures. This dependence would render the state 
less responsive to true public need and neglectful of the greater national 
interest. Sieyès, one of the key thinkers in the school of popular sov-
ereignty, was hostile to the entire idea of sovereign debt and favored 
instead building public fi nance on a system of taxation. In fact, one of 
his central political writings on the French Revolution focused on the 
centrality of instituting a tax law. This law of taxation would allow 
the power of money to “be merged with and, so to speak, made to be 
identifi ed with the nation so that it can never serve anything other than 
the general interest.”71 He considered the rejection of public credit so 
fundamental to a truly responsive constitutional government that he 
self-consciously called his proposed tax law nothing less than a “con-
stitutional law of taxation.”72 This is not to say that Sieyès favored an 
immediate repudiation of the monarchist debt; in fact, he felt it should 
be repaid on practical grounds.73
This concern with the potentially detrimental effects of sovereign 
debt on a nation’s core responsiveness to public need was not limited to 
Sieyès, the paradigmatic popular sovereigntist. The monarchist David 
Hume famously claimed in 1752 that, “either the nation must destroy 
public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation.”74 Istvan Hont 
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drew from his concern for national security in the face of potential in-
ternational disorder. Hume felt that public credit tended to sacrifi ce the 
nation’s long-term strategic interests for the short-term concern of main-
taining fi nancial stability, and also to embolden government offi cials 
to embark on capricious escapades. Hume was “quite ready to counsel 
sacrifi cing the property of thousands (he estimated that Britain had ap-
proximately 17,000 foreign and domestic creditors) on the altar of the 
nation’s national security interests,” and felt this much preferable “to the 
horrible political crime of sacrifi cing millions for the temporary safety 
of creditors.”75
As Sieyès and Hume make clear, the argument that sovereign debt 
may be inherently antithetical to public responsiveness and the national 
interest is not a distinctly contemporary contention. Today’s concerns 
about lost economic sovereignty are not at all new, and are in fact al-
most as old as the modern conception of statehood itself. The claim 
that a sovereign state, however it is internally constituted, should be 
attentive to the national interest, does not need to reach the extremes of 
Sieyès and Hume. This “outcome orientation” could result in a separate 
requirement that government action should be responsive to the public 
needs of a state, whether those are defi ned in statist, rule-of-law, or 
popular terms. This impulse might be operationalized in a requirement 
that valid sovereign debt at least ostensibly serve the public interest of 
the state, as distinct from the merely personal interest of a ruling elite 
masquerading as a modern offi cialdom.76 Indeed, the second prong of 
the odious debt doctrine as imagined by Alexander Sack—that debt 
may be considered odious if it does not benefi t the underlying popula-
tion—offers such an example.
Caveats and Normative Ramifi cations
Three caveats are important before going any further. First, this dis-
cussion should not be misunderstood as either an attempt to provide 
anything close to a suffi cient interpretation of the thinkers mentioned 
or a comprehensive overview of theories (or theorists) of sovereignty. 
The four paradigms highlighted here, which resonate across political 
theory, law, and international relations, demonstrate how different ideas 
of political legitimacy result in divergent expectations about government 
competence for sovereign contracts and the subsequent continuity of 
those contracts. However, the theorists within each approach disagree 
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in common with scholars I have categorized as belonging to a different 
school. Furthermore, theories of sovereignty could be organized along 
different dimensions altogether, or divided into a more detailed categori-
zation. The key is that the implicit or explicit adoption of one as opposed 
to another politically contested vision of sovereignty will result in very 
different understandings of what is rational, appropriate, and reputa-
tionally enforceable. A summary of this analytical structure is presented 
schematically in Table 2.1.
The second and related caveat is that, although this discussion high-
lights the politics at the center of sovereign debt, it should not necessarily 
be taken as a normative assessment of either these ideas of sovereignty 
in their own right or their appropriateness for international fi nance. 
Certainly, a sharper framework for talking about sovereign legitimacy 
enables clearer political and moral debate, and I will touch upon policy 
questions in this book’s conclusion.77 However, I intend my categoriza-
tion to serve two principal purposes that are analytically prior to policy 
argument. First, the discussion gives lie to any descriptive contention 
that a working sovereign lending system can possibly be apolitical and 
neutral. Indeed, the dominant continuity norm is deeply indebted to a 
vision of the state with roots in a particular (and contested) political 
philosophy. And second, these categories can be used as analytical build-
ing blocks to enable an empirical assessment of why one as opposed to 
another political philosophy holds sway in international debt fi nance 
today. Conceiving of these schools as “ideal types” helps to identify his-
torical variation in the conceptual framework that underlies sovereign 
debt over time. In the historical discussion of the following chapters, I 
use them as such to underscore the shifting claims and outcomes in sov-
ereign debt and reputation through the last century.
And, fi nally, it is important to point out that any sovereignty concept 
has both an internal and an external dimension. I have focused primarily 
on internal sovereignty, or the “fundamental authority relation within 
states between rulers and ruled.”78 However, these internal relations are 
in turn linked to an external dimension of sovereignty, or “a fundamen-
tal authority relation between states which is defi ned by international 
law.”79 To enter into an internationally enforceable contract, a sovereign 
must exist in both dimensions. It must have suffi cient standing or rec-
ognition internationally to be considered a valid sovereign actor, able to 
make acknowledged promises on behalf of a state. It must also have the 
necessary relationship with the underlying people and territory to allow 
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contract or repay a debt. Although these two elements are conceptually 
separate, in practice they frequently reinforce each other. A sovereign 
actor with a strong and clear relationship with the underlying people and 
territory should have fewer problems gaining international recognition 
and entering transnational contracts than a sovereign actor with only a 
tenuous link. However, the reverse channel of infl uence can also work: 
international recognition and capital may allow a government with only 
a tenuous internal link to strengthen its relationship of domestic control. 
In short, the recognition and enforcement practice of any sovereign debt 
regime both depends upon and reinforces a given sovereignty paradigm. 
The doctrine of sovereign continuity, a central philosophical support for 
the current sovereign debt regime, rests on and gives force to a statist 
conception of legitimate sovereignty. Laying bare the theoretical claims 
implicit in sovereign debt practices can thus sharpen our historical anal-
ysis of the lending system and provide the groundwork for more clear-
eyed assessments of its ramifi cations.
Case Studies in the Historical Narrative
Considering theories of sovereignty may well be analytically important, 
but how can we study the historical development of these concepts in 
actual debt practices? If a politics of sovereign legitimacy is indeed impli-
cated in every debt interaction and reputational assessment, the universe 
of potential cases is virtually limitless. Although the following chapters 
unfold in roughly chronological order, they do not constitute anything 
close to a complete history of the sovereign debt regime. Instead, I con-
struct a genealogy of how debt continuity norms associated with a statist 
discourse dominated over other plausible alternatives in modern debt 
and creditworthiness. As such, I make use of historical events and cases 
insofar as they help us understand the contingent factors that enabled or 
disabled more fl exible approaches to debt continuity.
In selecting cases to study over the last century, I have focused par-
ticularly on those in which we might expect to see resistance to debt 
continuity—and then asked whether or not any such resistance materi-
alized or resulted in an actual repudiation. In chapter 1, I suggested that 
the issue of odious debt best highlights the questions of this book, and 
also that debt repudiations would be most likely to occur in situations 
of regime change. Therefore, I take a look at those regime changes most 
likely to result in odious debt claims. One possible set involves social 
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and frequently seek to refashion the social and economic as well as the 
political structure of the state. As such, regimes resulting from social 
revolutions would reasonably be expected to repudiate the debts of the 
previous regime, particularly those debts used for projects that the new 
regime fi nds objectionable.80 Another range of cases includes postdicta-
torial democracies, which do not necessarily seek to rework the entire 
foundations of the state, but do aim to place the nation on a more rep-
resentative political footing. They could be expected to repudiate debt 
that has been lost to corruption, or debt associated with contracts signed 
due to political favor.81 I have for the purposes of this book laid aside the 
question of postcolonial regimes and state succession, in part in order 
to limit the potential universe of cases but also because a separate body 
of law and treaty interpretation has emerged with regard to state suc-
cession.82 As such, while these cases provide helpful background they 
are as a whole less appropriate for thinking through the mechanisms 
supporting debt continuity more generally. I also do not consider post-
monarchical or postimperial regimes, which may consider their prede-
cessor governmental forms inappropriate for a new historical period but 
still tend to claim continuity with the history (as well as the wealth and 
glory) of the previous regime.83
Within this universe of potential cases, my approach focuses on the 
contingent historical factors that enable or disable certain possibilities at 
key historical moments. In studying a particular country case, therefore, 
my goal is not dispositively to explicate state or creditor action. Rather, 
it is to understand how discursive frameworks and material conditions 
construct behavioral pathways and thus render certain decisions more 
or less likely. In one phrasing, this approach “is less directed toward 
answering the question ‘why’ than the question ‘how,’ or, more specif-
ically, ‘how possible’.”84 In other words, while some projects focus on 
why actors select one path over another, this approach focuses instead 
on the prior issue of how a potential choice is constructed or closed off. 
In effect, a state’s ultimate reason for taking a particular decision is 
less central, while the conditions that make that decision conceivable or 
plausible constitute the core of my study.
As such, different country cases play very different roles in the study 
and thus are given varying weight and space in the analysis. Through 
the case studies of the Soviet Union and Costa Rica in chapters 3 and 4, 
I argue that the early twentieth century constituted a potential turning 
point in the debt regime—an open moment in how ideas of legitimate 
statehood and sovereign continuity fi t into international debt and repu-
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discourse and practice could have been adopted more widely. This is 
not to say that state and creditor decisions emanate directly from these 
larger structures; this gives insuffi cient weight to the agency of partic-
ular decision makers and social groups. Rather, the focus is on how 
an action taken by a particular state—and perhaps a particularly brave 
or foolhardy state—was enabled by broader circumstances and in turn 
could have enabled further fl exibility going forward.
The openness that these two cases reveal about the early twentieth 
century raises questions about why additional cases did not materialize 
in the mid- and late twentieth century. In chapters 5 and 6, I highlight 
how new material and ideational circumstances emerged in ways that 
undermined the early twentieth-century potential. Part of the historical 
puzzle for my analysis is precisely the absence of cases that pose a seri-
ous challenge to the dominant discourse and practice. While my interest 
in studying this lacuna undermines the plausibility of a pure case study 
method, these chapters highlight several situations in which a challenge 
to the statist framework was either attempted or would have been most 
likely to occur. Just as state action can underscore the enabling potential 
of broader material and ideational frameworks, partial state action or 
the absence of state action where it might otherwise be expected can 
illustrate how a particular context closed off certain possibilities.
In thinking through these cases as manifestations of a particular prac-
tice or as potential turning points, I ask three sets of questions: First, to 
what degree are principles or claims presented and actions taken that 
challenge the dominant discourse and practice? Although such articula-
tions will frequently be made by states themselves, this is not necessarily 
the case. Given that norms are expectations of appropriate action shared 
by a community of actors, other “members of the community” may well 
provide arguments that enable states to act in ways that shift the long-
run practices. Second, what is the immediate argumentation or response 
by other relevant actors for a given issue? Such actors may include inter-
locutors in a particular claim or dispute, external decision makers, and 
other relevant fi gures. Such a response may be hostile, receptive, or may 
vary across actors. The nature of the response is important as well. Are 
interlocutors hostile to the formulation of a claim, its practical effect, 
or both? Part of the claim may be rejected (i.e., the existence of a right 
to repudiate) while another part is implicitly accepted (i.e., that after re-
pudiation a state should be treated as an “unseasoned borrower” rather 
than a “lemon”). Finally, what is the longer-term reaction of the relevant 
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and to what degree is their response uniform? In the case of sovereignty 
and odious debt treatment, is creditor willingness or unwillingness to 
lend a response to an assessment of creditworthiness (which implicitly 
suggests a theory of sovereignty, as I discuss above) or are there other 
issues involved?
As should be clear from the foregoing, the particular characteristics 
that are relevant for any given country’s experience are likely to vary 
across case and historical period. Just as the uniform repayment norm it-
self is more complex than it fi rst appears, its historical study escapes easy 
simplifi cation. I have identifi ed creditor interactions and broader norms 
of sovereignty as key in shaping possibilities in sovereign debt and repu-
tation. However, the particular historical contours of these factors—and 
the ways in which specifi c actors react to these larger structures—are 
necessarily specifi c to time and place.
Conclusion
Mainstream approaches to international fi nance implicitly assume that 
it is theoretically untenable and impracticable to suggest alternatives to 
the current expectation of consistent repayment, or to ask about ideas of 
sovereign legitimacy underlying debt and reputation. These suppositions 
act as a bulwark against real engagement with proposals to alter the 
global debt regime in any signifi cant way. However, the political theory 
and expected economic practice surrounding sovereign debt are not as 
unvarying as they initially appear. The assumptions of political neutral-
ity, reputational stability, and creditor uniformity do not hold. And dif-
ferent concepts of sovereignty suggest alternative plausible approaches 
to debt obligations. As the following chapters emphasize, this theoret-
ical openness is joined by historical variation. The dominant norm of 
debt continuity is not an ahistorical market principle but rather has been 
actively constructed and supported by changing market structures and 
broader political ideologies over the last century.
Although efforts can be made to cordon off the political realm from 
international business and fi nance, politicized concepts and arguments 
eventually tend to slip through. Given that the international debate sur-
rounding sovereign legitimacy is unlikely to die down, it makes sense 
for those involved in the international economic arena to address the 
question of sovereignty head-on rather than risk being blindsided far-
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questions of state legitimacy, reputation, and debt continuity have come 
to life in the concrete experiences of states, their creditors, and the other 
global actors that play a role in the sovereign debt arena. And these past 
experiences should offer some insight into how sovereign debt issues—at 
their intersection with questions of reputation and politics—are likely to 
unfold into the future.
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